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INTRODUCTION

Luck almost certainly is not a prominent feature of anybody's ideal
criminal justice system. Criminal responsibility usually attaches only when
mens rea combines with volitional conduct-or the withholding of some
required act-to produce a public harm. 2 These component parts of criminal

* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; J.D. 1976, LL.M. 1982,
Southern Methodist University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jeb
Lock and Rhodes Hamilton in the preparation of this article. The author also benefited greatly
from the very helpful criticisms and suggestions that Michael Ariens, Kay Reamey, and John
Schmolesky offered. They deserve a large share of credit for whatever value this piece may have,
but they share no blame for any errors that remain. Dave Moran generously shared his work on
this topic, reassuring the author that Texas is not the only jurisdiction to base criminal
punishments in part on bad luck.
I. DIRTY HARRY (Warner Studios 1971).
2. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the
Factors on which our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 283 (1988); JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 3 (3d ed. 2001) (Criminal law involves
investigation of "doctrines that have developed over the centuries for determining when a person
may justly be held criminally responsible for harm that she has caused."); id. at 81 (noting actus
reus and mens rea are two components of crimes, generally); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 113 (3d ed. 200 I) ("[C)rime consists of
both a physical part and a mental part.").
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responsibility are widely accepted and utilized to define what is a "crime."3
Taken together, they express the simple but powerful idea that one is
accountable to society for the consequences of what one does, but only if
mental fault 4 prompted the act. A voluntary act that produces even the most
horrible harm is usually not criminal without an accompanying mental
fault; 5 it is an "accident."6 Similarly, culpability alone is not punished/ in
large part because its occurrence in human beings is too common to bear
sanction unless it results in action.
The origins of these precepts may be ancient, but they continue to be
the foundations on which substantive criminal law is built. 8 Even a cursory
examination of the contents of contemporary criminal law casebooks
confirms that mens rea coinciding with actus reus to cause a result, equals
criminal responsibility. 9
3. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 14-26 (2d ed. 1960) (The
theory of penal law reflected in traditional and current codes of various countries includes
culpability and act provisions.); see, e.g., VOLKER K.REY, GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL
PART 97 (2002) (German criminal law requires culpability, the principle of nulla poena sine
culpa.).
4. By "mental fault" I do not intend necessarily to connote a normative judgment about the
mental state of the actor. Many crimes are expressions of social regulation unrelated to right-orwrong, or to good-or-evil. They merely promote order in society, or regulate certain activities. In
the traditional dichotomy, these offenses are concerned with mala prohibita instead of malum in
se. Mental fault and similar expressions of a culpable mental state are used in this article to refer
to a broader kind of "fault" or "blame," namely, the kind that distinguishes punishable acts from
accidents. It is the kind of fault that Wayne Lafave says more accurately describes "what crimes
generally require in addition to their physical elements." LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 113.
5. The United States Supreme Court observed in the Morrissette case:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems oflaw as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty
of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
6. Sargent v. State, 518 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1975) ("No act done by
accident is an offense against the law.").
7. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 113 (The basic premise for the mens rea requirement is
captured by Latin maxim actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty
unless his mind is guilty).).
8. See sources cited supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 113 (Crime consists of both a physical part and a
mental part.); MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW 17 (4th ed. 1999)
(Mens rea and actus reus are required for "every crime."); RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 53 (2002) (Voluntary act or omission and
mens rea requirements are essential elements of just punishment.). Of course this is not literally
true in every case. Strict liability crimes omit the culpability requirement altogether, but some
have argued that due process is violated by applying strict liability to "serious" crimes with
substantial punishments. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 147-48 (remarking that strict liability
raises constitutional questions). Likewise, culpability in the form of failure to perform a required
duty may be punished although there is no "act" committed. These "omission" crimes merely
reflect, however, that a culpable failure to act can have foreseeable consequences and be punished
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Strikingly at odds with this traditional formula is the trend in recent
Texas criminal law to punish actors for the harm they cause, regardless of
their culpability and conduct. Some of the examples of this departure from
the notion of complete individual responsibility are not new. The crime of
felony-murder, for instance, punishes a criminal actor for what actually
happens, and not only for what he contemplates. 10
The felony-murder doctrine has been widely debated, 11 and states have
adopted differing limitations on the rule. 12 More recent applications of the
"lottery approach" 13 to criminal responsibility seem increasingly to pass
into the criminal justice armory with scarcely a notice, much less the robust
and continuing discussion that accompanied and has continuously dogged
felony-murder.
Moreover, the variations on this "fault-lite" view of crime and
punishment extend beyond mere substantive criminal statutes. Causation
rules and punishment enhancements have also been affected by a decreasing
reliance on culpability. The reach of criminal sanction has been extended on
many fronts, as amply illustrated by changes in, and interpretations of,
Texas law. While some of the examples from Texas are unusual-perhaps
even unique-others are found in other jurisdictions. 14
The purpose of this article is not to identify and describe every
instance in which Texas law departs from the traditional notion of
punishment based strictly and proportionately on individual fault. Rather,
the purpose is, through examination of selected examples, to consider the
ways in which this departure manifests itself in Texas, and to discuss
only if the duty to act is clearly established by law.
10. Clayton T. Tanaka & Larry M. Lawrence, II, The Felony-Murder Doctrine, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1479, 1480 (2003) (For the felony-murder doctrine, it is irrelevant whether killing
was intentional or accidental.); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 447-48 (1985) (The felonymurder rule makes it possible that the most serious sanctions might be applied to accidental
homicide.).
II. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516.
12. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 519- 27 (discussing ways in which the doctrine has been
limited).
13. By " lottery approach," I mean to suggest-and will demonstrate- that guilt and
punishment are determined to a significant degree by chance, rather than by reference to
consequences that reasonably might be expected to ensue from certain actions. As will be
explained further infra, felony-murder has an element of chance in the outcome because the actor
who sets out to commit a felony other than homicide or assault may find himself or herself
prosecuted, convicted, and punished as a murderer, despite a complete absence of intent to cause
that result, or even a substantial risk. While some states have limited the scope of the doctrine in
an effort to prevent this very eventuality, Texas and others arguably have applied felony-murder
statutes in exactly this way.
14. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss whether Texas serves as a model in
this regard for other jurisdictions, or whether Texas is simply following the example of others.
Probably, both are true to some extent.
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whether the interests served by these "new" ways of conceptualizing
criminal responsibility adequately and satisfactorily account for the
interests arguably better served by a more restrictive definition of criminal
fault.
II.

THE ROLE OF FAULT AND HARM

Fault-based punishment serves a principal purpose of criminal law:
deterrence. 15 If a person foresees harm, or at least the possibility of a certain
kind of harm, he or she might be able to weigh the risk of punishment for
causing that degree of harm against the anticipated benefits (e.g., money,
property, revenge, satisfaction, etc.) of committing the crime. Ideally, this
calculus produces-at least sometimes, and perhaps often-a decision that
the potential costs outweigh the likely benefits, and the person chooses not
to act.
Culpability, the voluntary act requirement, causation, and the degree of
punishment play important, interdependent roles in this cost-benefit
analysis. To begin, consider the various degrees of culpability employed in
Texas.
Following the Model Penal Code's template, Texas uses a four-tier
gradation of culpability, ranging from intent 16 to criminal negligence. 17 To
act intentionally is to have the "conscious objective or desire to engage in
the conduct or cause the result." 18 The actor with this state of mind
ordinarily foresees the harm his conduct will cause; indeed, it may well be
his purpose to bring about that harm. At the other end of the culpability
scale lies criminal negligence. The criminally negligent actor does not
intend to cause a particular kind of harm; he or she is not even aware that a
risk of such harm exists. 19 The actor should be aware of the risk, though, for
there is a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that the "result will occur."20 If
the actor turns her mind to the possible outcomes of her conduct, and if she
appreciates risk as society expects a reasonable person to do, she will see
the harm that might result. 21
15. It also is retributive, particularly when its degree is determined in part by the quantum of
harm done to a victim.
16. Acting "intentionally" under the Texas Penal Code corresponds to acting "purposely"
for Model Penal Code crimes. Compare TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003), with
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(a) (1985).
17. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§ 6.03(d).
18. !d. § 6.03(a).
19. See id. § 6.03(d) (A person is criminally negligent "when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk.").
20. !d.
21. If the actor did understand the risk, she would not be criminally negligent by
proceeding, but would be reckless./d. § 6.03(c).
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What is the practical result of this difference? The person who does not
perceive the risk, but should have, is punished for failing to appreciate the
risk posed by his behavior. 22 If he knows of the risk and takes it, he is more
culpable than the unwitting risk-taker, more culpable still if the risk he
perceives is extremely high, 23 and most culpable if he not only knows of the
high risk, but actually intends the result. As the actor's degree of fault
increases, so does his or her punishment-at least, usually.
In Texas law, this dynamic is illustrated by the homicide statutes. 24
They include murder/ 5 manslaughter, 26 and criminally negligent
homicide. 27 Generally speaking, these offenses differ only in culpability and
in punishment, the act requirement and causation being the same for each? 8
As the culpability level decreases, the punishment level decreases
accordingly. 29 Murder, which requires an "intentional" or "knowing"
killing, is a first degree felony. 30 Manslaughter, or reckless killing, is a
second degree felony; and criminally negligent homicide is a state jail
felony. 31
This ordering of punishment based on degree of culpability is quite
common in the Model Penal Code and Texas Penal Code. It reflects the
rather common-sense view that the guiltier mind deserves stronger
punishment in order to satisfy the need for proportional sentences. If
culpability, voluntary act, and causation work in concert to achieve a
legitimate goal of criminal justice, then an "increase" in any one of these
22. It may also be said that he is punished for failing to have the capacity for appreciation
we expect of the " reasonable person."
23. This person is said to act "knowingly." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(b).
24. See generally id. § 19 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004-2005) (homicide statutes).
Essentially the same scheme exists in the Model Penal Code. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210 (1985) (same).
25. Texas also has the crime of "capital murder," which is distinguished from "murder"
only by the existence of aggravating factors which result in a punishment of death or life
imprisonment. Compare TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005), with id. §
19.02 (Vernon 2003).
26. Id. § 19.04 (Vernon 2003). Texas no longer differentiates between voluntary
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. "Heat of passion" killing, previously considered
voluntary manslaughter, is now included within the murder statute because it, like murder, is
intentional killing, but with a mitigating feature.
27. Id. § 19.05.
28. The notable exception is fe lony-murder, which does not require any level of culpability
for the killing itself. See id. § 19.02(b)(3). Felony-murder is discussed in more detail infra Part III.
29. This generality does not always apply, even for homicide. Felony-murder is a notable
exception to the general principle, not because no intentional wrong is intended (although one
might not be), but because the intent in felony-murder is limited to the underlying felony rather
than to the killing.
30. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(c).
31. Id. §§ 19.04(b), 19.05(b). Punishment ranges are described in the Texas Penal Code. See
id. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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elements produces a greater likelihood of public harm, and should be metas it is in the basic Texas homicide scheme of increasing degrees of mental
fault- in a greater effort to deter that harm through punishment. In other
words, if the harm being addressed is unlawful killing,32 a more direct
"intent" to bring about that result should be punished more severely in order
to serve both deterrence and retribution purposes if volition and the degree
of harm remain constant.
While harm is an important part of the definition of crime,33 it must be
remembered that the harm being addressed by criminal law is "public
harm," which is not necessarily that harm suffered by the immediate crime
victim. 34 For this reason, punishment for criminal conduct is tied more
closely to culpability than to the amount of harm suffered. That is not to
say, of course, that degree of harm plays an inconsequential role in criminal
responsibility. In assault crimes, for example, the degree of harm, often
expressed in terms of "bodily injury," "serious bodily injury," or death,
plays its own part in determining the punishment range for an offense.35
Similarly, in property crimes the dollar value of the item stolen or damaged
may decide the range of punishment. 36 Notwithstanding the significance of
degree of harm, a common sense of proportionality in punishment demands
more emphasis on culpability than on harm. To demonstrate this ranking,
consider capital murder, a crime in which the ultimate punishment can be
exacted only for intentional or knowing killing.37 By contrast, criminally
negligent homicide-a crime in which the harm (death) is exactly the
same-is barely a felony. 38
Voluntary act and causation are not as likely to vary in this analysis
because ordinarily they either exist, or they do not. Unlike culpability, if an
act does not quite "cause" the public harm, the threshold of causation
simply has not been crossed and the actor is not held responsible. Similarly,
if an act is a "little voluntary," but does not satisfy the minimum
voluntariness required for criminal sanction, there has been no crime.39
32. Unlawful killing necessarily requires a voluntary act that causes death.
33. See HALL, supra note 3, at 2 13.
34. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 1 (noting crime is distinguished from civil wrong by
"social harm" done, rather than private injury).
35. Compare TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004--2005) (simple assault
causing bodily inj ury with varying culpability levels), with id. § 22.02 (aggravated assault- a
fe lony-for causing serious bodily injury) .
36. See, e.g., id. § 3 1.03(e) (theft punishment gradation scheme based on property value).
37. ld. §§ 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004--2005), 19.02(b)(l ) (Vernon 2003).
38. See id § 19.05 (Vernon 2003). It is a state jail felony, the lowest felony classification. !d.
§ 19.05(b). Manslaughter, which is a reckless killing, is a second degree felony. ld. § 19.04.
39. Acts required for inchoate crimes, discussed elsewhere in this article, may appear at first
to be an exception to this generalization. They are not, though , because the act- which does not
constitute a suffic ient act for the proposed or attempted crime- is wholly suffici ent for the
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With these generalizations about the culpability-act-causation-result
relationship in mind, it is possible to discern a pattern, and perhaps a trend,
in Texas criminal law running against the traditional formula for individual
responsibility and proportionate punishment. As noted, one of the more
prominent illustrations of this is felony-murder, especially as practiced in
Texas.
III. TEXAS FELONY-MURDER AND WHY IT'S BETTER TO BE L UCKY THAN
TO BE CAREFUL

The origins of felony-murder lie in a period of English common law in
which virtually all felonies were punishable by death. 40 In that environment,
it was unimportant whether one labeled as murder an accidental death
occurring in the course of committing another felony. Punishment for the
underlying felony was exactly the same as that for murder. As the number
and kind of non-dangerous felonies grew, the rule became less satisfactory,
as illustrated by the following statement of this development by Professor
Jerome Hall in his classic work, General Principles of Criminal Law:
When early law distinguished voluntary harm-doing from
misadventure, it remained for a long period content if the former
were involved in any manner that could be related to the actual harm.
The rule was that a person who intentionally caused any injury
should be responsible for any resultant harm, however unforeseeable
or accidental that might be. The felony-murder, misdemeanormanslaughter rules rose to check the range of this rationalization of
penal liability as regards criminal homicide; and the ancient formulas ,
mala in se-mala prohibita, provided ready pegs on which to rest
these important limitations. It became established that the defendant
must have intended to commit a harm that was legally proscribed and
that his liability for the homicide would to some substantial extent be
determined by reference to the gravity of the harm he intended to
commit. The next step was to restrict such penal liability by requiring
the offender to be reckless with reference to the death caused by him
in the commission of a crime. Thus the progress of criminal law in
the [nineteenth] century reached the point of almost eliminating the
felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter rules, and this has been
inchoate "crime." Thus, it is not correct to say that an attempted crime is not a completed crime. In
a very real sense, it is. It is accurate to say that the act constituting the attempt does not complete
the attempted crime, but that is a different thing altogether.
40. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 450 ("[T]he [felony-murder] rule 's purpose was
not fully articulated because all felonies at common law were punished by death . ... "). It is not
literally true that at the time of creation of the felony-murder doctrine all felonies were punishable
by death. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV.
59, 92 (2004) (noting that not all felonies of the period were dangerous, or capita l offenses).
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achieved in the 1957 English Homicide Act. This promising
development was, however, interrupted and in some states even
reversed; in the United States, the common law rules and analogies
drawn from them remain very much ,t!ive. The consequence is that
negligence and even chance occurrences enter into the determination
of penal liability . . .. This, of course, cannot be reconciled with the
dominant and, it is believed, sound meaning of the principle of mens
rea. 41

While felony-murder does remain very much alive in the United
States, 42 the rule has been limited in a number of ways in order to make it
more palatable, and more consistent with contemporary understanding of
criminal responsibility. 43 One of the common ways in which felony-murder
has been limited is by requiring that the underlying felony be dangerous to
life,44 a limitation that serves the deterrence rationale. 45
If the purpose of felony-murder is to prevent would-be felons from
pursuing their felonious intent in a manner that endangers others by
exposing the actors to possible murder charges, then the rule should reflect
that purpose by excluding "safe" felonies from its reach,46 or by
encouraging felons to commit even dangerous crimes more carefully. 47 On
the other hand, if the rule is intended only to deter in some general way the
commission of all felonies, limitation is unnecessary, but then, efforts to
deter all felonies would be ill-served by the felony-murder rule in any
event. Any deterrent effect must be nearly nonexistent for the felon
committing a "safe" felony because he or she is not deterred by the
41. HALL, supra note 3, at 129- 30 (footnotes omitted).
42. It has been noted that, "The United States ... remains virtually the only western country
still recognizing a rule which makes it possible ' that the most serious sanctions known to law
might be imposed for accidental homicide."' Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 447-48.
43. See Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.3d 396, 398- 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Cochran, J.,
concurring); DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 519- 27; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 744-55
(4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW]; Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 446-47 (noting
that most states have limited the rule 's potential harshness).
44. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 43, at 745.
45 . One scholar unimpressed by the deterrence argument has noted that, "The need to
rationalize the felony- murder rule in deterrent terms arises only because of the rule 's conflict with
accepted culpability principles." James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule:
A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1450
(1994).
46. Seeid at 1448-49.
47. George Fletcher stated the proposition this way:
[T]he state justifiably threatens robbers who cause death with an additional punishment
in order to make them, as it were, "careful" robbers- they should do everything
possib le to minimize the risk of death. Imposing this additional burden on them is not
considered unjust, for they, as robbers, have embarked on a forbidden course of
endangering human life.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BAS lC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 193 ( 1998).
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unforeseeable consequence of harm to another, and would not imagine
death as a possible result of the intended crime. 48 Even felons bent on
committing dangerous felonies probably would not be deterred by a death
that might result. Assuming then that dangerousness, instead of the
commission of felonies generally, is the chief evil at which the felonymurder doctrine is aimed, a state might craft its limitation in one, or both, of
two ways.
For example, a state could limit felony-murder to those underlying
felonies that are inherently dangerous, 49 such as armed robbery.
Commission, or attempted commission, of these "dangerous" felonies
makes foreseeability of death at least likely, and certainly culpable. 5° Two
important problems lurk in this approach, though. First, it is sometimes
difficult for courts and would-be felons to determine with precision whether
the felony is "inherently dangerous." 51 In the absence of clarity about this
central characteristic, it is unlikely the law will achieve a deterrent effect.
The second problem is that this approach applies the rule mechanically,
48. The Delaware Supreme Court stated the role of foreseeability of harm in felony-murder
this way:
The only rational function of the felony-murder rule is to furnish an added deterrent to
the perpetration of felonies which, by their nature or by the attendant circumstances,
create a foreseeable risk of death. This function is not served by application of the rule
to felonies not foreseeably dangerous. The rule should not be extended beyond its
rational function. Moreover, application of the rule to felonies not foreseeably
dangerous would be unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing
malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.
Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 268-69 (Del. 1967).
49. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 43, at 746; DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 519; FLETCHER,
supra note 47, at 193. By "inherently dangerous," I mean only that the crime, stated in the
abstract, is per se dangerous, and not that the crime may be committed in a dangerous fashion .
DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 519.
50. An armed robber scarcely could avoid appreciating the high risk to human life involved
in the venture. That awareness of risk amounts to recklessness for any killing (intent exists for the
underlying robbery), a culpability that is less than that ordinarily required for murder punishment,
but one that at least includes foreseeability. However unlikely, it is possible for even the armed
robber subjectively to be unaware of the risk involved, a possibility that undermines to some
extent the accepted rationale for felony-murder. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 520.
Unawareness of the risk is nevertheless culpable if criminal negligence can be the basis for
homicide, though it would not be the basis for murder.
51 . Theft often has been included within the list of dangerous felonies, but is it "dangerous"
to the victim? In terms of physical injury, the answer usually is no. Indeed, it is the intent of the
thief that the crime go unnoticed. There is no doubt, however, that theft may be committed in a
dangerous fashion or with foreseeably dangerous consequences. Possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon is another such offense. The crime does not seem dangerous per se; it is what the
felon does with the firearm that makes the crime dangerous, not the possession of the weapon.
And yet, the crime has been held to be inherently dangerous. See State v. Moffitt, 431 P.2d 879,
894-95 (Kan. 1967), overruled on other grounds by State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153, 162-63
(Kan. 1980) ("(C]ircumstances of the commission of the felony should not be considered in
making the determination.").
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without regard for the way in which the offense was committed. A "safe"
felony might be committed in a dangerous manner, just as a dangerous
felony might be committed "safely." 52 If preventing injury and death is the
aim of the rule, the rule should be stated and applied with sufficient
flexibility to account for the way in which the felon chooses to act, and not
merely by reference to an often arbitrary characterization. Indeed, it is this
emphasis on the manner in which the felony is committed that is the second
way a state might limit felony-murder to cases involving dangerousness. 5 3
Texas has employed the felony-murder doctrine continuously since
before the Civil War. 54 Applying a transferred intent view of the doctrine,
felony-murder cases in nineteenth-century Texas almost invariably involved
violent felonies and resulted in first-degree punishment. 55 When the Texas
Penal Code was revised in 1973 to incorporate much of the Model Penal
Code, Texas broke with the Model Code's relegation of felony-murder to a
mere presumption. 56 Instead, the state modified its stance on the rule in a
different way: it limited its application to deaths caused by the commission
or attempted commission of "an act clearly dangerous to human life."57 By
selecting this phrasing for the limitation, the Texas Legislature opted for a
dangerous manner of commission view, rather than for the inherently
dangerous felony approach. 58
52. Consider armed robbery, a felony that is on everyone's list of inherently dangerous
crimes. If the robber carries an unloaded pistol but does not display it during the robbery, he may
be guilty of armed, or aggravated, robbery. See, e.g., TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 29.03 (Vernon
Supp. 2004-2005). Regardless of the care taken by the robber for the lives of the persons being
robbed , and the absence of any significant probability of harm, the robber nevertheless could be
convicted of murder if a person dies accidentally in the course of the crime because the felony is
inherently dangerous. In this example, the robber may be acting carefully precisely because of the
possibility of enhanced punishment, as Professor Fletcher suggests. See FLETCHER, supra note 4 7,
at 193 . When that care produces the desired result, the rule works well, but when a person is
harmed despite the care exercised by the felon, and the death is ruled a felony-murder, the
deterrence effect of the rule is undermined by the indeterminable result.
53. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 520.
54. See Binder, supra note 40, at 167- 71 (discussing the origins and development of felonymurder in Texas).
55. See id. (discussing the Texas felony-murder cases of the nineteenth century). Texas has
been called the "felony murder center of America during the nineteenth century, with about onefourth of all the reported felony murder convictions in the country." !d. at 167.
56. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.2(I)(b) (I962).
57. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (Vernon 2003). This precise formulation does
not seem to exist in the current penal statutes of any other state, at least with respect to felonymurder. See also GERALDS. REAMEY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN TEXAS 214 (3d
ed. 2000).
58. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§ 19.02(b)(3). The Texas felony-murder statute provides:
(b) A person commits an offense if he:
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony , other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from
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Texas ' s formulation focuses on the danger created by the actor rather
than on the nature of the felony, thereby leaving open the possibility that
virtually any felony might trigger the operation of the rule.59 Shifting the
focus of the rule to the way in which the felony is committed allows Texas
courts to continue to view felony-murder as they did in the nineteenth
century, essentially a transferred intent provision. 60 In essence, the felonymurder rule now effectively "dispenses with the necessity to prove the mens
rea for murder by substituting proof of the requisite culpability for the
primary felony." 61 This kind of "free transfer" is inconsistent with commonlaw transferred intent principles, at least for unlike crimes, 62 but might be
justifiable in the Texas version if foreseeability of harm is inherent to some
considerable extent in doing an act "clearly dangerous to human life."63
How, then, does the Texas felony~murder doctrine depart from
generally accepted notions of culpability, individual responsibility, and
proportionate punishment? The answer lies, not in the language of the
statute alone, but also in the way the provision has been applied.
Felony-murder cases in Texas usually involve what other states would
the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous
to human life that causes the death of an individual.
!d. (emphasis added). ln her concurring opinion in Lawson v. State, Judge Cochran of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals explained the Texas limitation:
The Texas Legislature chose to narrow the common law felony murder rule set out
in section l9.02(b)(3) of the Penal Code in two distinct ways. First, the statute requires
that, regardless of the specific underlying felony (always excepting manslaughter, of
course), the defendant must commit an act that is "clearly dangerous to human life."
Instead of simply enumerating specific felonies which, in the abstract, are usually
dangerous, the Legislature required that the state prove that this specific actor, under
these specific circumstances, did some act that was clearly dangerous. This limitation
preserves the original justification for the felony murder rule- a person is criminally
responsible for the consequences of his dangerous and violent criminal conduct- while
protecting the defendant against prosecution for murder for an unforeseeable death
which occurs during the commission of a felony which is violent in the abstract, but not
in the particular case. Second, the Legislature narrowed the proximate cause
relationship in the felony murder rule. Not only must the defendant commit an act that
is clearly dangerous to human life, it must also be that specific act which causes the
victim's death.
Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.3d 396, 399-400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Cochran, J. , concurring)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
59. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (Only
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are exempted as underlying felonies for felony-murder.).
60. See Binder, supra note 40, at 169- 70 (finding nineteenth century felony-murder in
Texas was based on transferred intent); REAMEY, supra note 57, at 214 (describing current felonymurder rule as a "statutory version of transferred intent").
61. REAMEY, supra note 57, at 214; see also Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999); Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
62. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 518 (stating felony-murder is "a misuse of the
transferred intent doctrine").
63 . TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§ 19.02(b)(3).
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label inherently dangerous felonies. 64 Occasionally, though, a nonviolent
felony is the basis for felony-murder. Consider, for example, Rodriguez v.
State, 65 a case in which the felony was the possession of a weapon on
licensed premises. 66 The co-defendants argued to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals that the offense did not involve intentional violence, in
fact, they had left the bar when asked to do so, and without any violence
being threatened. 67 Once outside, they called for the bar's owner to come
out, but before he did, he was struck in the head and killed by a shot fired
into the building from the defendants' pistol. 68
Although the underlying felony was complete before the killing
occurred, the defendants were convicted of felony-murder. 69 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument that the conviction could
not rest on evidence of a nonviolent felony, noting that the legislature
exempted only voluntary and involuntary manslaughter from the scope of
felonies to which felony-murder applies. 70 The court reversed the
conviction, though, because the defendants were not in "flight" from the
commission of the felony, and the State had therefore not proven an
element of the offense. 71
Rodriguez illustrates one of the conceptual problems Texas courts have
had with the doctrine. A better-reasoned response to the defendants'
argument about the character of the offense in Rodriguez would have been
that the Texas felony-murder statute has nothing to do with the "inherent"
nature of the felony. The clear language of the text requires a determination
that the felony was committed in a dangerous fashion, and there was
nothing about Rodriguez's conduct while committing the felony that would
have caused death. Had it acknowledged that fact, the court would have
sustained the appellants' point of error without reaching the question of
whether they were in flight from the felony, although the court's finding
that the felony had terminated before the violent act was committed seems
correct.
Implicit in the Rodriguez court's view of felony-murder is that even

64. See, e.g., Flores v. State, 102 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. refd)
(fmding child victim died of blunt trauma injury to head inflicted by defendant, which was felony
injury to a child).
65. 548 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
66. /d. at 28.
67. See id. at 29 (finding evidence that defendants left immediately when told to leave and
they were not chased out or threatened).
68. !d. at 28.
69. /d. at 27-28.
70. See id. at 29- 30 (stating there was sufficient evidence that defendants had possession of
a weapon while on a premises licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages- a felony).
71. !d.
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felonies not involving actual violence or threat of violence may be the
predicate upon which a murder conviction is based. This cannot be so,
however, for two reasons. First, that reading simply does not comport with
the language of the statute that the felony (or flight from it) must be
accompanied by an "act clearly dangerous to human life."72 Second,
traditional transferred intent cannot support that interpretation.
Transferred intent, as applied to felony-murder, would borrow the
general intent to commit the felony and use it to supply the intent required
for murder. 73 But the principle of transferring intent requires that essentially
equivalent "intents" be involved, at least unless the actor foresees the result
that her intended conduct will produce. 74 This was not the case in
Rodriguez/ 5 and it probably would not be true in almost all "nondangerous" felonies. What Rodriguez intended-the underlying felony of
possession of a weapon on licensed premises-was not the equivalent of
homicide in terms of social harm/ 6 and in the absence of any act placing
another in danger of death, punishment for murder is obviously
disproportionate for what was intended or risked.
Moreover, freely transferring intent from a nonviolent felony to
murder eases the prosecution's burden of proving the culpability element
beyond a reasonable doubt in a way that creates a due process problem.77 If
it would be difficult for the state to prove that the defendant intentionally,
or even recklessly, killed someone in the course of committing a felony,
unrestricted transferred intent would permit the state nevertheless to convict
of murder simply by showing an intent to commit the felony. 78
72. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (Vernon 2003). Because there was no "act clearly
dangerous," it also could not be the proximate cause of the death of the victim, another element
required by the Texas statute. I d.
73. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 518 (citing the "felony-murder rule is sometimes
defended on the basis of the transferred intent doctrine" arguing that the "felon's intent to commit
a felony is transferred to the homicide").
74. See id. In which event, transferred intent is a highly artificial and unnecessary way to
deal with the culpability requirement for the unintended crime. !d. (providing an example of how
the transferred intent doctrine is misused).
75. It appears that the pistol Rodriguez displayed in the bar was unloaded, at least until he
left the bar. See 548 S.W.2d at 28 ("Rodriguez displayed a pistol, pointing it out the door and
clicking it.").
76. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 518 (finding, ordinarily, transferred intent does not apply to
an actor's intent to cause one social harm to be transferred to a different and greater social harm);
Roth & Sundby, supra note I 0, at 454 (noting "(t]he inapplicability of transferred intent to fe lony
murder [is] evident when the crime's two different mens rea elements are examined: the intent to
commit the felony and the culpability for the killing").
77. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 455-57 (discussing the use of "constructive
malice," like transferred intent, is akin to a conclusive presumption raising "grave constitutional
questions").
78. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 519 (noting the felony-murder rule operates to ease
prosecutor's burden of proof).
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Undoubtedly, this option is attractive to prosecutors, but as Professor Hall
observed, it "cannot be reconciled with the dominant and, it is believed,
sound meaning of the principle of mens rea."79 In effect, using transferred
intent in this way punishes the felon for being a bad person, and not for
acting dangerously. 80 As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "To make an
act which causes death murder, then, the actor ought, on principle, to know,
or have notice of the facts which make the act dangerous." 81
A somewhat different, but related, problem with the felony-murder
formulation in Texas is that these cases virtually always involve an act that
could be viewed as dangerous to human life. After all, a death has occurred
because of something the felon has done in the course of his crime. How
could that act not be dangerous? The proof of its dangerousness is in the
result. 82 So, to borrow facts from the Rodriguez case, if the pistol had
djscharged accidentally jnsjde the bar and killed the owner, possessing the
pistol on licensed premises must have been "clearly dangerous to human
life" because someone died.
Texas courts have not expressly adopted this position, but it is possible
to see its influence at work in Loredo v. State. 83 Pedro Loredo and an
accomplice set out to burglarize a restaurant. 84 Once inside the building,
Loredo used a gas torch in an effort to melt the lock on the establishment's
safe. 85 He later said in a statement to police that papers on a desk may have
been ignited by the torch, but an accomplice testified that a third actor
started a fire by using a lighter to ignite papers in cabinets in the office, the
place where the fire investigator concluded the fire was set. 86 Two
firefighters were asphyxiated and died in the fire, and the defendant was
charged with felony-murder. 87 Loredo contended on appeal from his
conviction that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had
79. HALL, supra note 3, at 129- 30.
80. See CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 43, at 763 (noting the felony-murder doctrine punishes
one who is a "bad person" with a "bad state of mind" who has caused a "bad result").
8 1. OLNER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 56 ( 1881 ).
82 . In Depauw v. State, the appellant argued the jury should have been given a limiting
definition of "act clearly dangerous" in the jury instruction because otherwise, "the jury will likely
always conclude that an act which caused a person to die was an act clearly dangerous to human
life. " 658 S.W.2d 628, 634 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd). The Amarillo Court of
Appeals rejected the argument, holding that the term has a "common and ordinary meaning so that
a juror could properly understand such term." /d. One Texas author has noted, "No court has yet
defined precisely the parameters of the concept ' act clearly dangerous to human life.' There is no
meaningful way to distinguish between acts that are so dangerous and those that are not." 6
MICHAEL B. CHARLTON, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: TEXAS CRIMINAL LAW 135 (2d ed. 2001).
83. 130 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref' d).
84. !d. at 277.
85. !d. at 278.
86. !d. at 279.
87. !d. at 278.
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committed an "act clearly dangerous to human life" because starting the fire
was the independent act of his accomplice. 88
The Houston Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence regarding the
fire was "conflicting," and noted that the State was bound to prove that the
defendant intended to promote or assist the setting of the fire by the
"primary actor." 89 Without discussing what evidence supported that finding,
the court held the evidence sufficient to establish a dangerous act, citing
defendant's knowledge that the restaurant was on fire when he left the
building without trying "to put it out or call the fire department." 90
If, as the Loredo court's opinion seems to concede, the defendant was
not shown to have set the fire, intended that it be set, or known that it would
be set, it is hard to imagine what clearly dangerous act the defendant
committed. Surely it could not have been that he left the fire burning
without calling the fire department, especially because firefighters were the
victims. One supposes the court would not prefer that he place firefighters
in the very danger from which they succumbed, and the court cited no legal
duty on the defendant's part to extinguish the flames or report the fire. 91
Following a repetitious recitation of the circumstances surrounding the
burglary, a review of the law of felony-murder, and the court's apparent

88. I d. at 279.
89. I d. at 279- 80.
90. !d.
91. Perhaps the court believed, without saying so, that a legal duty existed because the
defendant created a peril, and therefore owed a duty to the firefighters which he breached by
failing to warn them. But if there was insufficient evidence to believe that he created the peril by
setting the fire or aiding and abetting the person who did so, then no duty was shown to exist.
The strange case of Mallard v. State directly involved the role of omission as an "act
clearly dangerous to human life" in felony-murder. 162 S.W.3d 325, 327- 29 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2005, pet. filed). In the very early hours of the morning, and after a night of drug and
alcohol use at a club, Chante Jawan Mallard struck a pedestrian while driving herself home. !d. at
328. The man she struck was thrown onto the hood of Mallard's car and hit the windshield, where
he remained stuck. !d. Rather than stopping to render aid, Mallard continued driving, parked her
car in her garage and put the door down. Jd. The victim was alive and moaning when Mallard
drove into the garage. Jd. Later in the morning, she told a friend what had happened, and, after
touching the body with a rake, the friend decided that the victim was dead and should be removed
from the windshield and buried. Jd. With the help of his cousin, the friend removed the body and
eventually left it at a park where it was discovered later. !d. A medical expert testified at trial that
the initial impact did not kill the victim, and would not necessarily have caused him to die. Jd. at
330- 31. Death was from loss of blood from the fai lure to receive medical aid. !d. at 331 - 32. The
defendant was charged with felony-murder, the underlying felony being failure to stop and render
aid. !d. at 329. The "act clearly dangerous to human life" was the failure to summon aid for the
victim, an omission. See id. The court of appeals held the evidence to be factually and legally
sufficient to support the defendant' s conviction, despite her contention that an omission could not
satisfy the "act clearly dangerous" requirement. !d. at 329- 32. The appellate court also rejected
Mallard's argument that the jury charge was defective for including an instruction on Texas's
broad transferred intent provision. ld. at 333.
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abandonment of the argument that the defendant set the fire himself, 92 the
Loredo court concluded without any real explanation that, "a rational trier
of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt appellant, while in the
course of committing burglary, was a party to lighting a fire, an act clearly
dangerous to human life, which caused the deaths of two firefighters." 93
Cases like Loredo and Rodriguez at a minimum suggest that the
"limiting" factor in Texas felony-murder cases limits very little. There is,
however, another limit on the scope of felony-murder. Unfortunately, that
"limit" recently has been virtually removed in Texas.
As Professor Dressler explains:
Most states recognize some form of "independent felony" or
"collateral felony" limitation. That is, the felony-murder rule only
applies if the predicate felony is independent of, or collateral to, the
homicide. If the felony is not independent, then the felony merges
with the homicide and cannot serve as the basis for a felony-murder
conviction. 94
This limitation is known as the "merger doctrine." 95
The practical effect of the merger doctrine is to prevent the State from
elevating to murder every assault resulting in death. Every homicide
necessarily includes a felony assault because causing serious bodily injury
or death to another converts simple assault to felony (aggravated) assault. 96
Consequently, in the absence of a merger limitation on felony-murder, a
prosecutor wishing to avoid having to prove an intentional or knowing
killing could simply prove that the actor committed-perhaps
unintentionall/7-an act amounting to assault that produced death. For
example, if a person lightly shoves another and causes him to trip, hit his
head and die, without the merger doctrine a felony-murder conviction could
be based on the felony assault (intentionally shoving) resulting in death.
What prevents such a manifestly unjust prosecution? Only the
92. See Loredo , 130 S.W.3d at 280. After describing the role of the torch wielded by the
defendant, and reciting the opinions of experts as to the source of the fire, the court concluded that
the defendant "was a party to lighting a fire. " !d. Despite the court' s acknowledgment that party
liability requires proof of intent to promote or assist the criminal act, it never answered in its
opinion the defendant ' s claim that the fire was set without his prior knowledge, participation, or
intent. See id.
93. !d.
94. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 520.
95. !d.
96. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). An assault also may be
aggravated to a felony by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon. !d. § 22.02(a)(2).
97. Aggravated assault in Texas requires that the actor assault another, resulting in serious
bodily injury (which includes death). !d. § 22.02(a)(l). The simple assault may be committed by
intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. !d. § 22.01(a)(l). To act knowingly or recklessly is to
act unintentionally. See id. § 6.03(b)-(c) (Vernon 2003).
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restraint of the public prosecutor. And if that fails, what prevents a murder
conviction with its manifestly disproportionate punishment? Only the good
sense and self-restraint of a jury. 98
Until 1978, the only form of merger doctrine existing in Texas lay
within language of the murder statute. The Texas Penal Code specifically
excepts manslaughter99 from the felonies that can form the basis for felonymurder.100 In 1978, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals joined the
mainstream of states 101 employing felony-murder by extending the statutory
limitation to include the felony assault that is the predicate for murder. 102
Writing for the court, Judge Odom concluded that continuing to allow
felony-murder to rest upon felony assault "would make murder out of every
aggravated assault that results in a death ... because murder is usually the
result of some form of assault. " 103
A scant three years later, the court of criminal appeals backtracked on
its decision in Garrett in a habeas case entitled Ex parte Easter. 104 Easter
involved felony injury to a child victim. Despite the obviously assaultive
nature of the offense that caused the child's death, the court refused to apply
the merger doctrine, reasoning that injury to a child was not a lesserincluded offense of murder, and therefore not precluded by the doctrine. 105
With this decision, a considerable number of felony assaults became
available again to support unintentional murder prosecutions. 106
Perhaps Ex parte Easter should have been seen as the writing on the
98 . Of course, if the "act clearly dangerous to human life" limitation were taken seriously,
one would not expect a felony-murder conviction. But, if nonviolent felonies are within the scope
of the rule, and if the resulting death is sufficient evidence upon which to find the dangerous act,
only the sound discretion of the charging and fact-finding authorities stands between the unlucky
aggressor and conviction.
99. Previously, the statute excepted voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, but when
voluntary manslaughter- "heat of passion" killing- was abolished as a separate offense and
incorporated as a mitigating factor within the punishment scheme for murder, involuntary
manslaughter- reckless killing- became the only form of manslaughter. See TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN.§ 19.04 (Vernon 2003).
100. /d. § 19.02(b)(3).
101. Russell R. Barton, Application of the Merger Doctrine to the Felony Murder Rule in
Texas: The Merger Muddle, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 535 , 541 (1990) (noting " [the merger rule is]
followed in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States"); Gail W. Stewart, Felony Murder in
Texas: The Merger Problem, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1981) (The merger doctrine is the
prevalent rule in most American jurisdictions.).
102. See Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543 , 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
I 03. /d. at 545.
104. 6 15 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane).
105. /d.
106. Easter was roundly criticized by commentators. See Barton, supra note 101 , at 542
(finding the rationale of Easter does not justifY exception to merger rule); Stewart, supra note 101 ,
at 1038-43 (analyzing and concluding that the result in Easter was not supported by precedent or
statute).
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wall. What remained of the merger doctrine was criticized by some
courts, 107 and after a twenty-one-year experiment with merger, the court of
criminal appeals in 1999 returned Texas to the small group of states with
felony-murder but no merger doctrine. The court held in Johnson v. State 108
that Garrett "did not create a general 'merger doctrine' in Texas," but
"stands only for the proposition that a conviction for felony murder under
section 19.02(b)(3), will not lie when the underlying felony is manslaughter
or a lesser included offense of manslaughter." 109 Ex parte Easter
conceivably could have been read in the fashion described by the Johnson
opinion, but Garrett itself clearly established a merger doctrine in the
classical sense by specifically excluding aggravated assault as a possible
underlying felony. 110
If any doubt remained after Johnson about the continuing viability of
merger in Texas, the court of criminal appeals resolved that doubt just two
years later in Lawson v. State. 111 Unlike Johnson, which involved felony
injury to a child, Lawson was a felony-murder case built on aggravated
assault. 112 A plurality of the court held, without elaboration, that because
intentional or knowing aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of
manslaughter, the merger doctrine did not apply. 113 Writing for herself and
two other concurring judges, Judge Cochran expressed the state of affairs
this way: "Does the judicially created merger doctrine still apply in Texas
felony murder cases? The majority declines to say. But if the Garrett
merger doctrine does still exist, it has been distinguished, limited, disagreed
with, and eroded into virtual nonexistence by this Court." 114 Judge Meyers,
the author of the court's opinion in Johnson, noted in his dissent to Lawson
that, "the majority's opinion permits precisely the type of circumvention we
cautioned against in Garrett and 'make[s] murder out of every aggravated
assault that results in death. "' 115
The confluence of these streams of judicial interpretation leaves felons
at the mercy of fate. A lucky person commits a felony and no one gets hurt.
An unlucky person does exactly the same and finds himself charged with
murder.
If the "act clearly dangerous" element of felony-murder is essentially
107. See REAMEY, supra note 57, at 218 n.30.
108. 4 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
I 09. !d. at 258.
110. See Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
111. 64 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 200 I).
112. !d. at 396.
113. !d. at 397.
114. !d. at 401 (Cochran, J. , concurring).
115. Jd. at 403 (Meyers, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Garrett, 573 S.W.2d
at 545).
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meaningless, and the merger doctrine is virtually nonexistent, Texas now
has reverted to the primitive view 116 that bad people should be punished for
whatever harm they cause, 11 7 without concern for whether they intended, or
even could foresee, 118 that outcome. Because "[a]ggravated assault is surely
an inherently dangerous felony," 119 and that assault, which includes even
unintended harm, can itself be the basis for felony-murder, conviction and
punishment lie, not in the hands and mind of the felon, but in chance and
prosecutorial whim.
This criticism was captured nearly twenty years ago in the following
general observation regarding felony-murder:
The "evil mind" theory conflicts with the basic premise that "the
criminal law is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the
abstract but also with the degree of criminal liability." Although the
general culpability rationale was perhaps sufficient as long as a
general intent of wrongdoing established malice aforethought, it
conflicts with the progressive trend of categorizing homicide
according to the degree of culpability. Indeed, the felony-murder rule
viewed from a general culpability perspective effectively eliminates a
mens rea element in convicting a felon for a killing occurring during
the commission of a felony, and results in the rule operating as a
strict liability crime: the occurrence of a killing is punished as murder
regardless of the defendant's culpability. 120
The "evil mind" or "bad person" principle now operates in Texas
through its felony-murder rule, despite the existence of better alternatives.
Since the adoption into Texas law of the Model Penal Code's culpabilitygrading scheme, 121 transferred intent- whether in its general
manifestation 122 or through felony-murder-is an unnecessary fiction. If a
felon negligently kills another in the course of committing his crime, he is
guilty of two offenses: the felony and criminally negligent homicide. If she
recklessly causes a death by fleeing the felony crime scene at a high rate of
speed, she commits manslaughter. And if he intentionally shoots a
convenience store clerk during a robbery, he is guilty of aggravated robbery
and capital murder, not because he committed a felony assault (a dangerous
116. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 458- 59 (The "evil mind" theory of felony murder
is based on seventeenth and eighteenth century ideas of English criminology and relies on a
"primitive rationale.").
117. Causing societal harm is not considered sufficient in itself to make a person
blameworthy. See Tomkovicz, supra note 45, at 1470.
118. As Holmes wrote, " A harmful act is only excused on the ground that the party neither
did foresee, nor could with proper care have foreseen harm." HOLMES, supra note 8 1, at 57.
119. Lawson, 64 S.W.3d at 400 (Cochran, J., concurring).
120. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 459 (footnotes omitted).
121. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 80- 82 (2002).
122. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.04(b) (Vernon 2003).
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act), but because the State should match the punishment to the degree of
blameworthiness by proving his intent. On the other hand, if the felon acts
as society wants felons to act-safely-and a death occurs despite the
actor's lack of culpability, that death should not be punished any more than
any other accident. 123
IV. ANOTHER PECULIAR APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL TRANSFERRED
INTENT

The reliance on transferred intent principles is not limited to felonymurder in Texas. Embedded within the causation section of the Texas Penal
Code is this provision:
(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a
result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what
he desired, contemplated, or risked is that:
(1) a different offense was committed; or

(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise
affected. 124
On its surface, the section appears to be an unremarkable expression of
the common transferred intent principle that if a person intends to harm
another person or property, he remains responsible even if his aim is bad, or
he mistakenly bums the wrong building. 125 A closer examination of the
language, however, reveals an extraordinarily broad formulation for which
there is no statutory clarification or limitation.
Does the statute really mean that regardless of what one sets out to do,
she is criminally responsible for any offense committed, and any degree of
harm inflicted? Does the section sweep even more broadly than felonymurder by encompassing all manner of crimes and public harms? Or
instead, does the phrase "the only difference" limit responsibility to that
which is foreseeable to the actor? Relatively few Texas cases rely on
section 6.04(b ), probably because the same result is available through
felony-murder and for co-conspirator liability. 126 Those cases that do rely
on the section amply demonstrate its potential for the same mischief that
infects felony-murder.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided Sargent v. State 127 after
123. See Tomkovicz, supra note 45, at 1472 ("Scholars and the public agree that, except in
the special cases presented by public-welfare type criminal enactments, accidents should not be
punished.").
124. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§ 6.04(b).
125. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 43, at 338---42.
126. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.02(b).
127. 518 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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section 6.04(b) had become effective, but its decision was controlled by
prior law. Sargent involved a dispute between a pimp and his prostitute's
customer in which the defendant's testimony was that he accidentally shot
and killed the customer during a confrontation about the fee. 128 Reviewing
the law of Texas at that time, the court stated the general principle of
criminal responsibility: "No act done by accident is an offense against the
law." 129 The court rejected the appellant's claim that the trial court should
have instructed the jury on accidental homicide, however, because the
defensive issue is available only "where the activity engaged in by the
defendant is lawful." 13 Citing prior Texas Penal Code Article 42, the
predecessor to section 6.04(b), 131 as a transferred intent provision, the Texas
court held that, "one intending to commit a felony, who accidentally
commits another felony is not legally excused but will receive the
punishment affixed to the felony actually committed." 132
This sweeping pronouncement of transferred intent reflects the broad
language of section 6.04(b )(1) holding a person responsible for whatever
offense actually occurs, if he sets out to commit some other offense. 133
What remained unclear after Sargent was the extent to which the general
principle it restated would be applied, and whether the court would
reconsider its position under the guise of interpreting new Texas Penal
Code language. Would the sparsely worded new statute, for example,
support a conviction for murder if the actor caused death by acting
recklessly? 134 The existence of statutorily defined culpability gradations in
the new code strongly suggested that transferred intent in this sense was an
anachronism that should be discontinued, but those structural changes
seemed to have no effect in the strange case of Thomas Earl Honea. 135
Honea and a companion were bent on robbery as they waited in their
potential victim's barn. 136 When he entered, the two robbers grabbed him
and threw him to the ground, tying him up and gagging him. 137 After
securing their victim, the men took $1,200 from the stock manager's shirt
pocket and left him lying face down on the dusty floor of the barn. 138

°

128. See id. at 807- 09.
129. !d. at 809.
130. !d.
131. Price v. State, 861 S.W.2d 9 13 , 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ("Section 6.04(b) replaced
article 42.").
132. Sargent, 518 S.W.2d at 809.
133. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(l) (Vernon 2003).
134. See REAMEY, supra note 57, at 66.
135. See Honea v. State, 585 S.W.2d 681 , 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
136. See id. at 684.
137. !d.
138. !d.
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According to a pathologist who examined the man's body, the vtctlm
139
inhaled dust which likely caused him to cough and vomit. He suffocated
140
because he had aspirated that vomitus into his lungs.
Honea confessed to the robbery, and there was no dispute about the
way it was carried out. 14 1 But he was not charged with simple robbery,
instead, the charge was aggravated robbery, a crime carrying the most
142
serious felony penalty, excepting only capital murder. The defendant
objected that the State's evidence failed to establish that he had
"intentionally and knowingly caused serious bodily injury" as required by
the aggravated robbery statute. 143 To put it more succinctly, he claimed in
effect that he had committed the robbery safely.
Given Texas's penchant for felony-murder, it is hard to understand
why the State did not pursue that charge instead. The underlying felony was
wholly different from manslaughter or even assault, and the act of binding
and gagging a victim and leaving him face down in the dust probably would
have satisfied Texas courts that it was "clearly dangerous to human life."
Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that both offenses are first degree
felonies carrying the same punishment.
Whatever the reason for the charging decision, aggravated robbery
carried the additional burden of establishing that Honea's intent to commit
robbery sufficed to convict him of a crime he clearly did not intend:
aggravated robbery. Relying this time on the language of section 6.04(b),
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed, "It is well settled that one
who, intending to commit a felony, accidentally commits another felony, is
guilty of the felony actually committed. The intent to commit the
contemplated offense transfers to the offense in fact committed." 144 The
court rejected the defendant's claim that the evidence established that he
acted, at most, recklessly or with criminal negligence, and concluded that
"[a]ppellant clearly intended to rob [the victim]; his acts resulted in the
offense of aggravated robbery, and he is guilty of that offense." 145
By continuing to use incorrectly a much criticized doctrine to punish a
"bad person," the Texas court missed an opportunity to exploit one of the
great advantages of the culpability scheme the legislature recently had
139. Jd.
140. Jd.
141. Jd.
142. Jd. at 683.
143. !d. at 684-85. In Texas, robbery is aggravated by causing serious bodily injury to the
victim, using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, or causing bodily injury to elderly or disabled
persons, or threatening or placing such persons in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); REAMEY, supra note 57, at 410.
144. Honea, 585 S.W.2d at 685.
145. !d.

2005]

FOR TUITY IN TEXAS CRIMINA L L AW

81

adopted. Honea confessed that he was guilty of robbery. He had the
requisite intent and did the act constituting the offense. It also is clear that
Honea' s participation in the offense left him open to a charge of
manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide because some risk was
involved in leaving the victim bound and gagged on the dusty floor. 146 But
what else would society expect Honea to do? Ideally, he would be deterred
from committing the robbery in the first place, but that deterrence comesif at all-from the robbery statute, not from the aggravated robbery statute
that punishes an outcome he tried to avoid and probably could not have
foreseen. Does the reasonable person expect a robbery victim lying bound
and gagged to vomit and suffocate? As robberies go, Honea' s does not
seem dangerous.
The decision to hold Honea responsible for a more serious crime
because of the unintended and unanticipated outcome signaled a continuing,
expansive use of the "lottery approach" to criminal justice in Texas. Unless
the State wishes for retributive purposes 147 alone to punish people like
Honea for the unintended and unforeseeable harm that is caused 148 by their
conduct, the interpretation of section 6.04(b)(l) must be limited at least to
that which reasonably would enter the imagination of the actor.149
Otherwise, no incentive will exist for criminals to act more carefully; 150
they will not be deterred by the possibility of a level of punishment they
cannot foresee; 151 and the principle of individual responsibility based on
mens rea will be undermined.
Some of the flaws in this form of "transferred intent" are evident, not

146. It is subject to di spute, however, whether the risk was "substantial" as required by the
definiti on of recklessness and criminal negligence. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(c)-(d) (Vernon
2003).
147. Retribution and the "evil mind" approach to criminal j ustice is a throw-back to an
early-and one would hope, less progressive-period. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 450.
148. I use "caused" here with some trepidation since it can have that meaning only in the
"but for" sense. There is no foreseeability.
149. The Model Penal Code reflects this in its treatment of causation for strict liability
crimes. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(4) (1985). It provides that " [w]hen causing a particular
result is a material element of an offense for whi ch absolute liability is imposed by law, the
element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's
conduct." Jd. This stands in stark contrast to the Texas Penal Code provision on causation, as well
as the Texas courts' interpretation of the felony-murder doctrine. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §
6.04 (Vernon 2003). The Model Penal Code drafters rejected punishment for strict liability crimes
in the absence of legal cause for foreseeability as being unj ust. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03
cmt. n.4 at 264; DUBBER, supra note 121, at 140.
150. See FLETCHER, supra note 47, at 193 (Felony-murder rule is intended to make robbers
more careful. ).
I 51. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on
the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497 ( 1973) (discussing the
correlation between punishment and actual harm caused).
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in what the court actually approved, but in what might have been dow
instead in Honea. As noted previously, Honea surely could have bee1
convicted of felony-murder, even with the understanding of that doctrin1
current in 1979. 152 But why bother with felony-murder instead of capita
murder? If it is correct, as the court held, that "[a]ppellant clearly intende<
to rob [the victim]; his acts resulted in the offense of aggravated robbery
and he is guilty of that offense" 153 then it would appear to be equall~
defensible to assert that Honea clearly intended to rob his victim; his act:
resulted in the offense of capital murder, and he is guilty of that offense
After all, a killing was done in the course of committing aggravatec
robbery- one of the acts that make murder into a capital offense-and th(
result was exactly the same as if Honea had killed his victim intentionally
In the words of section 6.04(b)(l), "the o-..1ly difference between wha
actually occurred and what [Honea] desired, contemplated, or risked is that
.. a different offense was committed." 154
It is preposterous, of course, that a person potentially would bt
sentenced to death for acting without the intention to do the acts and caust
the harm that define the crime of capital murder. 155 But in the "Neverland'
of Texas transferred intent, it is not easy to explain why that idea i~
preposterous. The easy answer seems to be that it would violate substantivt
due process, the usual resort for outcomes that feel wrong for reasons no1
readily identifiable. Perhaps the due process explanation lies in the obviom
reduction in the State's burden of proof on the culpability element required
for intentional murder: proof that the actor negligently caused a death in tht
course of robbery cannot substitute for the more difficult proof that it be
caused intentionally. 156 Honea remains the well-settled law in Texas. 157

152. Cf Mallard v. State, 162 S.W.3d 325, 333 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2005, pet. filed) (no1
error to give transferred intent instruction in a felony-murder prosecution).
153. Honea v. State, 585 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
154. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(l ). This holding also would be supported by the
principle in the Honea decision that, "one who, intending to commit a felony, accidentally
commits another fe lony, is guilty of the felony actually committed. The intent to commit the
contemplated offense transfers to the offense in fact committed." Honea, 585 S.W.2d at 685.
155. Apparently it was not so preposterous to the court of appeals in Gutierrez v. State, 681
S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd). There, the defendant, who
was a party to an aggravated assault on a peace officer that resulted in the officer' s death, was
convicted of capital murder. ld. The jury was instructed that it could convict if "the only
difference between what actually occurred (the Capital Murder of Berry McGuire), if it occurred,
and what the defendant desired, contemplated, or risked (the fe lony offense of Aggravated Assault
on a Peace Officer, against Berry McGuire) was that a different offense (Capital Murder of Berry
McGuire) was committed." Id.
156. See REAMEY, supra note 57, at 411.
157. Honea has been cited approvingly many times for the proposition that, "one who,
intending to commit a felony, accidentally commits another felony, is guilty of the felony actually
committed. The intent to commit the contemplated offense transfers to the offense in fact
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Transferred intent, as applied in Honea, supplements the felonymurder rule to provide punishment for all manner of unforeseen
consequences. It does so in a general, sweeping fashion that essentially
subsumes the felony-murder doctrine, leaving prosecutors free to choose
whether to employ the more general or more specific rule. A felony-murder,
for example, might be based on the general theory of transferred intent
rather than the felony-murder statute. 158 When this is done-and in all cases
in which general transferred intent is used-not even the pretense of the
"act clearly dangerous to human life" limitation exists, and even the most
petty crime is susceptible to its application. 159
V. ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR THE UNLUCKY
Criminal responsibility based on harm may be created by defining
substantive offenses in a certain way, or by tinkering with the manner in
which the burden of proof for the elements of those offenses may be
satisfied. Transferred intent in Texas, whether in its general application or
in the specific way it is applied to felony-murder, illustrates how culpability
can be imputed to persons who probably never imagined causing the harm
for which they ultimately were held responsible. Culpability also may be
presumed from certain conduct. 160
Accountability for harm may be achieved more directly, though,
simply by adjusting the punishment to match the degree of harm. One clear
example of this is the Texas assault statute, where punishments range from
only a fine for threatening bodily injury 161 or offensive touching, 162 through
high misdemeanor punishment for actually causing bodily injury, 163 to
felony assault for causing serious bodily injury. 164 The usual pattern for
such offenses, including assault, is to define the offense in traditional
committed." Honea, 585 S.W.2d at 685; see, e.g. , Loredo v. State, 130 S.W.3d 275, 282 (Tex.
App. -Houston (14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). The late-Judge Sam Houston Clinton, writing for
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Price v. State, discussed the history and apparent
legislative intent of section 6.04(b), implying that the language from Honea above was
inconsistent. 861 S.W.2d 913, 915- 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en bane).
!58. See, e.g., Hilliard v. State, 513 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (transferred intent
used to justifY murder conviction arising from felony assault on child).
159. The language of the Texas transferred intent provision in section 6.04(b) is not limited
to felonies, but apparently applies to all Penal code offenses. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §
6.04(b )(I).
160. See, e.g., id. § 22.05( c) (recklessness presumed for deadly conduct statute if actor
knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another).
161. !d.§ 22.0l(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
162. !d. § 22.0l(a)(3). If the victim of the offensive touching is an elderly individual or a
disabled individual, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. !d. § 22.0l(c).
163. !d.§ 22.0l(a)(l).
164. !d. § 22.02(a)(l).
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culpability terms, for instance, intentionally, knowingly, or perhaps
recklessly causing the harm. 165 Harm plays an important role in gauging the
seriousness of such offenses, but it is not the sole determinative factor.
Rather, it works in tandem with culpability and is limited, to a significant
extent by culpability, to arrive at a proportional sentence.
Due to a tragic episode in 1988, however, Texas now has a punishment
enhancement provision that defies conventional notions of harm-based
punishment commensurate with culpability. In the early morning hours just
two days after Christmas, San Antonio Police Officer Patricia Calderon was
in foot pursuit of a petty theft suspect when she went into the water 166 of
Salado Creek and drowned. 167 Louis "Popeye" Miller, the suspected thief
Officer Calderon had been pursuing that December night, was on parole and
had an extensive criminal history. 168
The Bexar County Chief Medical Examiner ruled the officer's death a
homicide, "because she died during the pursuit of a suspect," 169 but Miller
was charged only with theft and evading arrest, 170 both of which were
relatively minor misdemeanors. 171 No marks or injuries were found on
Officer Calderon's body indicating a struggle with the suspect, 172 and the
investigating homicide detective 173 said in the early stages of the
165. See, e.g., id. § 22.0l(a).
166. It is unclear whether Officer Calderon "fell" into the creek, or deliberately went into the
water in order to catch the fleeing thief. The brief account contained in the San Antonio Police
Department's website indicates that "[b]ecause of poor visibility she fell into the creek." San
Antonio Police Dep't, In Memory-1980s , http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/80smemory.asp (last
visited August 15, 2005). An Associated Press story carried by the Dallas Morning News
characterized Officer Calderon's action as "plunging into Salado Creek." Associated Press,
Proposal Concerns Police Safety, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 31, 1988,
http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_action (on file with author). A local news report
cited unnamed police sources as saying that Officer Calderon "apparently jumped into the water
because the suspect swam across the creek." Thomas Edwards & Dino Chiecchi, Suspect is
Arrested in Fatal Police Chase, SAN ANTONJO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 28, 1988, at 8-A.
167. In Memory-1980s, supra note 166. Officer Calderon was the first female officer of the
San Antonio Police Department to be killed in the line of duty. Edwards & Chiecchi, supra note
166.
168. Kym Fox, Man Jailed after Chase has Long List of Brushes with Law, Courts, SAN
ANTONJO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 28, 1988, at 9-A.
169. Edwards & Chiecchi, supra note 166.
170. Thomas Edwards & Don Driver, Officer's Drowning Sparking Law Effort, SAN
ANTONJO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 29, 1988, at 1-A.
171 . Miller allegedly stole cigarettes worth about forty dollars from a convenience store,
which would cause the crime to be classified as a Class C misdemeanor punishable by fine only.
See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(l)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). At the time, evading
arrest was a Class B misdemeanor in Texas law.Jd. § 38.04(c) (Vernon 2003).
172. See Edwards & Chiecchi, supra note 166.
173. The homicide detective assigned to the case was Lt. Albert Ortiz, who is now the Chief
of
Police
in
San
Antonio.
Albert
Ortiz,
Welcome
from
the
Chief,
http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/chief.asp?res= l024&ver=true (last visited August 15, 2005).
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investigation that there was no evidence Miller was involved in the
drowning. 174
Despite Miller's apparent lack of intent to harm Officer Calderon, San
Antonio Police Officers' Association President Harold Flammia said
officers were "feeling frustrated and disgusted" that the suspect could not
be held responsible for her death. 175 These sentiments were mirrored in
remarks made by Texas Senator Frank Tejeda just two days after the
incident occurred, when he said, "I felt shock and disappointment when I
heard this individual was only going to be charged with just theft, maybe
evading arrest." 176
In order to "clarify" and "strengthen" Texas law to impose criminal
responsibility on persons involved in an incident in which a law
enforcement officer is injured or dies, Senator Tejeda announced that he
would propose legislation to remedy the problem. 177 The "Calderon Law"
was enacted by the Seventy-First Texas Legislature in 1989. 178 Section
38.04(b) of the Texas Penal Code now provides that evading arrest is a third
degree felony if an officer suffers serious bodily injury, and a second degree
felony if the officer dies, as a direct result of an attempt by the officer to
apprehend a fleeing suspect. 179 This punishment enhancement is available
without regard for the culpability of the person fleeing or the risk assumed
by the pursuing officer; the person fleeing need not intend to cause harm to
the officer in order to be punished more severely. 180
Ironically, the Calderon Law was applied in a virtually identical case
in 1997, also in San Antonio. Park Ranger Paul Pytel was assisting San
Antonio police officers in pursuit of suspected gang members believed to
have fired on a group of people. 181 According to a newspaper account at the
time, Officer Pytel "either slipped or fell" into six feet of water while
wearing his police belt and equipment, including handcuffs, revolver, and

174. Edwards & Chiecchi, supra note 166.
175. Edwards & Driver, supra note 170.
176. Jd.
177. See id. Tejeda was quoted as saying that the laws defining responsibility for an officer's
death in a situation like Officer Calderon's were "convoluted." Jd. In fact, the laws were not
convoluted at all; they were quite clear that Miller could be held responsible for theft and evading
arrest, but not for the death. Police Association President Flammia remarked, "I looked at
everything [in the Texas Penal Code] you could possibly see, even reckless conduct, and it just
wouldn't fit." I d.
178. Tex. S.B . 916, 71st Leg., R.S., 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 488.
179. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.04(b) (Vernon 2003).
180. See Jameson v. State, No. 12-01-00374-CR, 2002 WL 31618286, at *3 (Tex. App.Tyler Nov. 20, 2002, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication).
181. Gloria Padilla, Ranger's Drowning Leads to Guilty Pleas, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Dec. I , 1994, at 3-B.
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182

radio. Pytel 's brother described him as being in excellent physical shape,
a person who enjoyed martial arts and outdoor sports, although he did not
know how to swim. 183 Two suspects were charged with evading arrest, now
potentially a second degree felony, in the officer's death. 184 One of the men
subsequently pleaded guilty to evading arrest causing serious bodily injury.
The tragic nature of these cases provides ample explanation for the
retributive character of the Calderon Law. Patricia Calderon was married to
a police officer; she was the first female San Antonio officer killed in the
line to duty, just after Christmas; she was a mother of a ten-month-old
child, and was described in glowing terms by her coworkers. 185 Paul Pytel
was a fit, young public servant in the prime of life. It is noteworthy that in
both cases, the suspects being pursued were not people who would evoke
public sympathy. Louis "Popeye" Miller was a parolee who had been
committing crimes since he was a teenager. 186 At the time of the incident,
he and an accomplice were believed to have stolen cigarettes from a
convenience store, and had run from the police. 187 The men who Park
Ranger Pytel was after were thought to be gang members who had just shot
at a group of people, hitting an eighty-three-year-old man in the leg.188
Both cases share another common feature: there was no evidence in
either to believe that the suspects tried to harm the officers, intended to
harm them, or even could have foreseen that they would come to harm.
Following the death of Officer Calderon, San Antonio criminal defense
lawyer Mark Stevens was quoted as saying, "They're now trying to create a
law that will make everybody feel better .... Unfortunately, the criminal
law cannot remedy every terrible tragedy that occurs." 189
182. Thomas Edwards, Two Fleeing Suspects Charged in Ranger's Drowning, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 2, 1994, at 9-A.
183. /d.
184. /d.
185. Edwards & Chiecchi, supra note 166.
186. Fox, supra note 168.
187. See Edwards & Chiecchi, supra note 166.
188. See Edwards, supra note 182.
189. See Proposal Concerns Police Safety, supra note 166 (i nternal quotations omitted).
Dave Moran expressed the same concern in an op-ed piece concerning People v. Bettcher, a
Michigan case in which a driver was prosecuted, and acquitted, in the death of a traffic
construction worker. See David A. Moran, Local Comment: Law is Faulty on Constmction-Zone
Killings, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 7, 2003 , http://www.freep.com/cgi-bin/forms (on file with
author). Ms. Bettcher was not shown to have been driving recklessly or negligently at the time of
the accident, but the Michigan law enhanced punishment merely because a construction worker
was killed. See id. Professor Moran wrote the following:
The problem with the statute is that it vio lates the bedrock principle of AngloAmerican law that people cannot be branded as felons merely for causing harm. To be
convicted of a serious criminal offense, a person must act with criminal intent, that is,
one must commit the act purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or extremely negligently.
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To assess whether Texas's evading arrest statute can prevent or
remedy even this particular kind of tragedy, one must consider the potential
scope of its application. The circumstances of the Calderon case provide a
striking example of the difference in punishment that bad luck can make. If
convicted of evading arrest under the law then in effect, the suspect in that
case would have been exposed to a maximum incarceration of 180 days in
the county jail. 190 Had he been sentenced under the Calderon Law, however,
imprisonment would have been for not less than two years, and up to
twenty years. 191 Obviously, the difference in these outcomes is vast. The
culpability of the offender-or, in this case, the absence of culpability-is
exactly the same whether the officer is injured, killed, or unharmed.
Because the person evading arrest need not intend to harm the officer, 192 it
is irrelevant whether he or she fled carefully. The offense is, in effect, a
strict liability crime, 193 despite the fact that it carries a felony punishment
far in excess of that usually considered appropriate where no culpability is
required.
In another respect, the fate of the offender is left purely to chance.
Unlike the broad Texas felony-murder formulation, punishment for evading
arrest is not dependent directly on causation. One might argue that if the
offender were not evading arrest, the enhanced punishment provision for
harm to the officer would not apply, but that argument misses the point of
causation. It is not sufficient that the actor be somehow, tenuously
connected with an unfortunate result. 194 To hold the actor criminally
responsible, he or she must do something that can be anticipated to produce
that result. The current evading arrest provision fails to differentiate
between an offender who tries to elude an officer by driving the wrong way
at high speed on a crowded freeway, and one who is pursued by an officer
in seemingly excellent health, in a safe environment, who is struck by
lightning or felled by a heart attack. 195
I d.

190. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.22 (Vernon 2003) (describing Class B misdemeanor
punishment).
191. See id. § 12.33(a) (Vernon 2003) (describing second degree felony punishment).
192. See Jameson v. State, No. 12-01-00374-CR, 2002 WL 31618286, at *3 (Tex. App. Tyler Nov. 20, 2002, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication).
193. REAMEY, supra note 57, at 164 (Enhancement provision for evading arrest is one of
"strict liability.").
194. "But for" causation is not sufficient to create criminal liability. See DRESSLER, supra
note 2, at 182- 83 (explaining that "actual cause" must also be "proximate cause" of harm for
criminal responsibility). If nothing more were necessary, parents presumably would be responsible
for the acts of their adult children because, but for them having conceived the children, the harm
done by their offspring would not have occurred. See id. ; see also DUBBER, supra note 121 , at 129
(both factual cause and legal cause required).
195. Senator Tejeda reportedly said, in announcing his intention to propose the Calderon
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As is true with felony-murder, any deterrent effect of this punishment
enhancement scheme is indirect, at best. The offender is punished, not for
what she intends, or even for what she does, but for the result. If the officer
is careless or reckless in the pursuit, and is injured or killed as a result of his
or her own disregard for safety, the offender not only is punished for that
result, but is not entitled to any reduction in punishment because of the
officer's contributory risk-taking. Comparative fault determines the degree
to which a person is civilly liable in Texas, but no formal mechanism exists
to compare fault for the harm in an evading case.
It is the very nature of evading arrest "to apply where there has been a
non-forceful evasion of arrest." 196 Forceful evasion-resisting arrest, for
example-which carries an increased risk of harm to the officer, is
addressed separately and with a higher base punishment than evading. 197
This makes sense as policy because resisting is inherently more dangerous
and likely to cause harm to the officer or others, than simply fleeing. 198
According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the purpose of the
evading statute is "to deter flight from arrest by the threat of an additional
penalty, thus discouraging forceful conflicts between the police and
suspects." 199
The purpose of the evading arrest statute is satisfied, then, whether or
not an officer suffers injury in the pursuit. Simply by fleeing arrest, a
suspect has committed an independent offense with its own punishment in
addition to the punishment attached to the crime for which the arrest is
being attempted. Indeed, even if no conviction or punishment is ever
obtained for the suspected crime, as long as the arrest is lawful,200
punishment can be exacted for evading. To demonstrate the perverse nature
of the punishment enhancement provision within the evading statute, a
person who forcibly resists arrest with a deadly weapon actually is subject
to less punishment than one who simply runs from the unlucky police
officer. 201
The net result of Texas's evading arrest punishment is that the lucky
are punished in accordance with their fault. Their unlucky counterparts are
Law, that cases involving an officer who dies of a heart attack, or is run over in a foot chase,
would fall within the scope of the proposed law. See Edwards & Driver, supra note 170.
196. Alejos v. State, 555 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
197. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (Resisting arrest is a
Class A misdemeanor.).
198. See Alejos, 555 S.W.2d at 449.
199. !d.
200. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.04(a) (Vernon 2003) (Evading arrest is flight from a
peace officer "attempting lawfully to arrest or detain" the suspect.); A lejos, 555 S.W.2d at 449.
201. Compare TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§ 38.04(b)(3) (second degree felony if pursuing officer
suffers death), with id. § 38.03(d) (third degree felony if deadly weapon is used to resist).
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punished disproportionately for risking exactly the same result, doing
exactly the same act, and having exactly the same state of mind. Chance
controls.
VI. GETTING "TWO-FOR-ONE" IS UNLUCKY IN TEXAS

Causation, in the cause-and-effect sense, is not an element of evading
arrest; if an officer suffers harm "as a direct result of an attempt . . . to
apprehend," 202 punishment increases. But causation plays its own part in
upping the ante for unintended consequences.
James Rathmell was driving while intoxicated when he struck another
vehicle, killing both of the women riding in the other car. 203 He was
indicted for involuntary manslaughter in both deaths. 204 Following
conviction on one of the indictments, Rathmell petitioned for habeas relief
in the remaining case on double jeopardy grounds. 205 His writ was denied in
the district court, but granted by the court of appeals, which held that the
second death constituted the same offense as the first. 206
Noting that Blockburger v. United Statei 07 is "not precisely applicable
to the case at bar," 208 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
lower appellate court, adopting the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, 209 in holding that James Rathmell effectively violated the
homicide statute twice by his one act because he caused the death of two
persons. 210 The Texas court's ruling in this regard was not ground-breaking;
indeed, it simply followed the lead of numerous decisions from other
jurisdictions reaching the same result. 211 What the case suggests about
fortuity is more interesting than its contribution to the understanding of
same offense.
There may be no constitutional impediment to charging a driver with
multiple deaths arising out of a single act-driving while intoxicated-but
the question remains whether doing so is sound public policy. Here, unlike
some of the previous examples of fortuity, the actor is culpable, and for
some, that settles the question of responsibility. For others, it is sufficient
explanation that twice the social harm was done- two deaths occurred-

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See id. § 38.04(b)(3).
See Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en bane).
Id.
Id.
See id.
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d at 35 .
Id. at 35- 36; see also State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 , 123 (Tenn. 1980).
Rathme/1, 717 S.W.2d at 36.
I d. at 35-36.
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and the single act deserves exposure to twice the punishment. As with the
other examples previously cited, though, the proper role of fortuity remains
an unanswered question.
How is deterrence served by such cases? Will the intoxicated driver
think, "I really should not drive because, if I kill two people accidentally, I
could be charged with two manslaughters instead of one?" Would the
actor's calculation of his exposure to punishment, a calculation society
hopes he will undertake prior to his criminal behavior, change his decision
because the driver finds the possibility of multiple prosecutions so much
more daunting that the prospect of a single prosecution, that he elects not to
drive? It seems much more likely that the drunk driver will be surprised to
learn that such a thing is even possible, than it is that he will be deterred by
punishment for multiple deaths, especially when he probably finds it
inconceivable that he will cause even one.
More to the point, is the driver more culpable if multiple passengers
are killed? Clearly, the answer is no. The degree of culpability remains
precisely the same in both cases, and it is purely fortuitous that one drunk
driver will kill one person while another will kill two, or three. None of this
is to suggest that it is unjust to hold the intoxicated driver responsible for
any death he causes. He risked great harm by his conduct, even if he
intended none at all. But what he risked is neither greater nor lesser
depending on the number of victims who actually die. It is possible that his
poor judgment will result in dozens of deaths, but he is not punished for the
magnitude of that risk or the mere possibility of multiple casualties, nor is
he punished for attempted manslaughter if no one dies. 212 The outcome is
determined largely by luck, but at least the possible consequences are
vaguely foreseeable, and the driver is culpable for taking the wheel while
intoxicated.213
Obviously, multiple punishment in such cases must be based on the
quantum of social harm actually inflicted, rather than on what was
contemplated, anticipated, or risked. It seems to be this very purpose that
motivated a recent definitional change in Texas law that expands the reach
of enhanced punishment beyond the unlucky intoxicated driver.
Prior to 2003, the Texas Penal Code defined an "individual" as "a

212. See Gonzales v. State, 532 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1916) (Involuntary
manslaughter negates specific intent to kill.). Of course it also is true that if the drunk driver and
others sharing the road are lucky, no one will die, despite his recklessness in driving while
intoxicated. In that case, the driver might be apprehended and punished for putting himself and
others at risk, or he might be even more fortunate and escape detection.
213. The drunk driver certainly is reckless for knowingly risking great harm. Punishing her
as if she had intentionally or knowingly caused one or more deaths, however, would be
disproportionate if degrees of culpability have any meaning.
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human being who has been born and is alive." 214 Because Texas homicide
law makes it a crime unlawfully to cause the death of "an individual,"215 it
was not a criminal offense to harm even a viable fetus. 216 The definition of
"individual" was amended, effective September 1, 2003, to include, "an
unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth."21 7
Consequently, a culpable act that injures a fetus is an assault, and if death
results, it is a homicide.
Texas was not the first state to criminalize feticide. 218 Unlike many
states, however, Texas extends the reach of the offense to nonviable
fetuses, 219 and presumably to embryos, 220 because the definition includes
"every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth."221 To date,
constitutional challenges to similar statutes in other jurisdictions have not
succeeded. 222
It is not the purpose of this article to explore the constitutionality or the
development of such statutes, much of which is centered on the prolife/pro-choice debate regarding abortion.223 Rather, it is the random quality
imposed on criminal punishment by Texas's inclusion of the unborn in its
homicide and assault statutes that bears closer examination.
The first conviction under Texas's new statute exemplifies both the
way in which the definition of "individual" will be applied, and some of the
several problems raised by its application. Emmanuel Rogers was convicted
of capital murder in Dallas in an apparent gang-related retaliation
214. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17) (Vernon 1974) (amended 2003) (current
version at TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § l.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004- 2005)).
215. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(l) (Vernon 2003).
216. See S. Jeffrey Gately, Texas Fetal Rights: Is There a Future for the Rights of Future
Texans ?, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 305, 309 (1991) (explaining that criminal statutes in Texas do not
protect the unborn); cf Cuellar v. State, 957 S.W.2d 134, 139-40 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997, pet. refd) (finding a fetus "born alive" after automobile accident, but who subsequently
died, was " individual" for purposes of manslaughter); DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 499- 500.
21 7. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § l.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). The term "death" also
was amended at the same time to include, "for an individual who is an unborn child, the failure to
be born alive." !d. § l.07(a)(49).
218. See, e.g. , CAL. PENAL CODE§ 187(a) (West 1999); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 731
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984); see also CRJMINAL
LAW, supra note 43 , at 729 (noting "about half' of states have extended homicide statute to
fetuses).
219. See Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 64
A.L.R.5th 671 (1998). Some states do not require the fetus to be viable, but do require it to have
passed the embryonic stage. See id.; see also People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 883 (Cal. 2004).
220. ln State v. Merrill, the Minnesota Supreme Court characterized an unborn child as an
embryo until the eighth week, and thereafter as a fetus. 450 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. 1990).
221. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § l.07(a)(26).
222. See Wasserstrom, supra note 219, at 687- 89, 729- 33 .
223. See HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg. , R.S.
(2003 ).
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shooting. 224 A pregnant woman was one of four vtcttms killed by the
defendant and others. 225 It is unclear from news accounts whether the
defendant knew the woman was nine-weeks pregnant at the time of the
shooting, 226 but in any event, such knowledge is not required expressly by
the relevant statutes. 227 Given the age of the fetus, it is quite possible that
the mother's pregnancy was not obvious.
The defense focused on the woman's drug use and the fact that she
lived with a drug dealer, evidence presumably offered to support its
argument that the fetus might not have been alive when the shots were
fired. 228 A medical examiner testified "that . . . the fetus appeared to be
healthy at the time of the 2003 shooting."229 Jurors in the case apparently
agreed from the beginning of their deliberations "that the fetus should be
considered a human being under the law." 230 While this conclusion may
have been supported by the medical examiner's testimony, one of the
prosecutors in the case opined, "They weren't looking for proof that the
baby was alive at the time of the mother's death." 231
The prosecutor's remark, if accurate, reflects a very real problem in the
application of the new statutory definitions encompassing embryos and
fetuses. "Individual" includes only one who is "alive,"232 whether he or she
has been born or not. 233 If, as the prosecutor suggested, the jurors in the
Rogers prosecution were not "looking for proof that the baby was alive,"
they were ignoring proof of an element the State was obliged to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt. The very existence of this element contributes
to, and illustrates, the importance of luck in determining punishment for a
feticide. Had the medical evidence established that the fetus was not alive at
the time the woman was killed-a fact that might not have been known
even to her-the State would have been unable to establish that the fourth
51

224. See Robert Tharp, Man Guilty in 2 Deaths: Capital Murder Case Marks 1 Time State
Law on Fetuses Used, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 5, 2005, at lB.
225. Jd.
226. See id.; see also Associated Press, Man Guilty in Deaths of Woman, Fetus, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 6, 2005, at lOB.
227. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§§ 1.07(a)(26), (49) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005), 19.02(b)( l)
(Vernon 2003), 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
228. See Tharp, supra note 224.
229. Jd.
230. Jd.
231. ld.
232. Exactly what "alive" means for a fetus or embryo is not addressed by the new statutory
definition. Whether that characterization will turn on unspecified medical criteria, or turn instead
on some political, philosophical, or theological determination, eventually will be decided by Texas
courts. The basis for such a decision and the decision itself, undoubtedly will be debated hotly,
thoroughly questioned, and passionately criticized by those who are disappointed in the courts'
holdings.
233 . See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § l.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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"individual" (the fetus) was killed by the defendant, because the fetus
234
would not have been an "individual" within the statutory definition.
It also was bad luck for the defendant that the woman was pregnant in
the first place, but that piece of misfortune would have provided no defense
to the homicide charge. Despite his ignorance (if he was) about the
existence of a fetus who would be "killed" by his gunshot, 235 the defendant
was subjected to twice the punishment236 for the single act that ended the
mother's life, not unlike the intoxicated driver who kills two passengers
riding in another car he hits while driving. 237 The existence of one or more
fetuses or embryos determines the exposure to punishment the actor faces,
whether or not he knows of their presence, 238 and regardless of whether the
woman who is pregnant is herself aware of her condition.
Not surprisingly, cases already have arisen in Texas in which the
apparent purpose of the killer was to cause the unborn child to die. 239 In
such cases, the actor not only is exposed to punishment for committing two
(or more) murders, but he or she also may be prosecuted for capital murder
on one of two theories. 240 The first of these is that intentional murder is
aggravated when "the person murders more than one person ... during the

234. Would an attempted murder prosecution succeed if the fetus's "death" preceded the act
of the defendant? This question leads to one of the law professors' favorite conundrums: the role
of legal and factual impossibility in the law of attempts. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 396-404.
While the Model Penal Code approach to impossibility is more concerned with the dangerousness
inherent in the fully culpable actor, than in whether the attempted crime is actually a "crime,"
Texas has adhered-at least in theory- to the traditional view that legal impossibility is a defense
for attempts. See id. at 403 ; see also Chen v. State, 42 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. Crirn. App. 2001)
(legal impossibility is a defense in Texas). Attempting to kill someone already dead is a classic
example of legal impossibility. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 402 (shooting a corpse believing
that it is alive is an example of"hybrid legal impossibility").
235. Assuming that the fetus was not killed directly by the bullet, but rather by the death of
the mother, the gunshot was a "but for" cause of the fetus's death, but perhaps not one that would
be foreseeable to him.
236. Of course, the punishment also could be triple or quadruple that attached to a single
death, depending on whether there were multiple fetuses.
237. See, e.g., Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en bane)
(holding an intoxicated driver responsible for two deaths resulting from a vehicular collision); see
also HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BTLL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg. , R.S. (2003)
(stating the death of a fetus "would be treated exactly like the death of children in the back seat").
238. There is no statutory language in Texas requiring knowledge of the pregnancy. See TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26); cf People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881 , 884 (Cal. 2004) (knowledge of
pregnancy not required in feticide).
239. See, e.g., Ron Nissimov & Eric Hanson, "Passion" Case may Test New Law, Hous.
CHRON., March 27, 2004, at AI (The defendant allegedly killed his pregnant girlfriend "because
she told him she was pregnant with his child."); Andrew Tilghman, Cases Test Law Giving Legal
Rights to Fetuses, Hous. CHRON. , April26, 2004, at AI (defendant allegedly knew girlfriend was
pregnant and "intended to kill both the woman and the fetus") .
240. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03(a).
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same criminal transaction," 241 a provision that seems more likely to have
242
been designed to target terrorists or other mass murderers. An alternative
theory of prosecution for capital murder exists if a "person murders an
individual under six years of age." 243 Offenders need not know the age of
244
the child victim in order to be convicted under this provision.
A capital murder must be predicated upon an intentional or knowing
killing. 245 Consequently, if the killer intentionally kills the mother but does
not intend to cause the death of the fetus or embryo, a question arises as to
whether the second, fetal death may be used to enhance the murder to a
capital offense.Z46 In a practical sense, however, the actor who knows his
victim is pregnant would be aware that killing the mother usually is
"reasonably certain" to cause the death of the fetus or embryo, qualifying
the fetal death as murder caused at least "knowingly,"247 and eligible for
capital murder prosecution.
As noted, the increased measure of social harm represented by the lost
unborn life is the apparent justification for punishing an unintended feticide.
Where the mother of the embryo or fetus causes its death, however, Texas
Jaw exempts the mother from punishment, and that exemption extends to all
homicides and assaults, even intentional killing and those caused by the
mother's self-induced intoxication.Z48 The Texas Legislature undoubtedly
was concerned with running afoul of the limited constitutional right of the
woman to choose abortion, 249 but the sweep of these exemptions from
criminal responsibility greatly exceeds that concern. Why should a person
who inadvertently caused the death of a fetus or embryo face felony
241. Id. § 19.03(a)(7)(A).
242. See Corwin v. State, 870 S.W.2d 23, 28 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en bane) (Sponsors
of H.B. 8 proposing the provision "made it clear that subsection (A) of what would become §
19.03(a)(6) [,predecessor of 19.03(a)(7),] ... was meant to cover 'mass' murders, such as terrorist
bombings or the killing of a number of people in a bar at the same time.").
243. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§ l9.03(a)(8).
244. Black v. State, 26 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en bane). The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals noted in its opinion that " [t]he legislature has decided that offenders who
intentionally or knowingly kill shall bear the risk of a capital-murder conviction if their victim is
under six." ld.
245. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (An offense is capital murder if a "person
commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(b)(l)" and one of the aggravating factors is
present.); id. § 19.02(b)(l) (Vernon 2003) ("A person commits an offense if he ... intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of an individual.").
246. Unlike non-capital murder, the capital defendant must know of the existence of the fetus
or embryo. Presumably, a mistake of fact defense would be available in a capital murder case in
which the defendant reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that the fetus had been aborted or died,
or that the woman was not pregnant. See id. § 8.02 (Vernon 2003).
247. See id. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 2003).
248. See id. §§ 19.06(1), 22.12(1), 49.12 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
249. See HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg., R.S.
(2003) ("SB 319 would not infringe in any way on a women's constitutional right to abortion.").
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punishment for that outcome, while the mother of the child faces none, even
though she intentionally produces the same result? If the State's interest in
the life of the unborn fetus warrants criminalizing acts that extinguish that
life, how is its interest less important simply because the mother causes the
death? To differentiate treatment in this way suggests that mothers have a
right to dispose of their children as they please, that is, that their personal
interest in their unborn always trumps that of the State, which clearly is not
the case with children born alive. 250 If it is bad policy to punish mothers for
harming the unborn, why is it good policy to punish all others? 251
Fortuity plays a pervasive role in this latest effort by Texas to punish
"bad people,"252 a category which, ironically, does not include mothers who
injure or kill their own fetuses. Use of fortuity in this instance is not wholly
justified by the State's interest in the unborn, nor is it merely a recognition
of the broader social harm that attends a life unlived. Were either of these
the grounds upon which Texas's feticide law is based, there would be no
exemption for mothers depriving the State and society of the benefits of that
life. Culpability or blameworthiness, in the narrow sense, also cannot be the
motivating factor, at least in the absence of a requirement that the defendant
know of the pregnancy in order to be held criminally responsible. For the
same reason, deterrence is not served by this approach because, except in
the case of the person who acts with full knowledge of the multiple deaths
his or her single act will produce, one cannot be deterred effectively by an
unforeseeable consequence.
Even if the goal of the statutes is to punish bad people, that goal is
achieved only randomly. Some bad people will be prosecuted for capital
murder for their intentional killings, while others will do precisely the same
act with the same motivation, and will be subjected to a single, non-capital
murder prosecution. 253 Other "not-so-bad people" will find themselves

250. For example, parental rights may be terminated for lesser transgressions, including
simply abandoning the living child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (l )(a) (Vernon 2002).
251. My purpose in raising these questions is to highlight the inconsistency in Texas's
position on feticide, and not to suggest that it is good or bad public policy to punish those who
harm fetuses or embryos. The bill analysis for this legislation contains summaries of statements
made by those favoring and opposing the amendments creating feticide, and all of the arguments
focus on the potential effect this bill ultimately will have on the question of abortion. See HOUSE
COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). While that is
undoubtedly a matter of serious concern and rational disagreement, it is strilcing that no questions
appear to have been raised regarding the random way in which this new law would distribute
criminal punishment. See id. The preoccupation with the more visible and emotionally-charged
abortion issue seems to have precluded any meaningful consideration of the role of proportionality
or individual blameworthiness prior to the bill's passage.
252. Punishing people for being "bad" amounts to retribution, it is punishment based on just
deserts. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 16.
253. See Sanford H. Kadish, Forward: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J.
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facing multiple murder or manslaughter punishments for a single act,
without any premonition-much less intent-that one of the "victims" even
existed. Neither retributivism nor the "just deserts" theory is served by the
increased punishment of these unintended, unforeseen consequences,
because the actor's punishment does not vary in accordance with the degree
to which he is "evil." It varies depending only on whether she is lucky.
VII. BAD LUCK TAKES MANY FORMS

Some will view these examples of fortuity as unjust punishment meted
out randomly to the unsuspecting. Others will consider them to be
illustrations of appropriate, proportionate consequences for persons who
cause great harm. The latter view will appeal to those who embrace the
notion prevalent in tort law that one is not entitled to a reasonable, careful,
healthy victim, but must accept the victim one actually gets. 254 Without
commenting on the soundness of this view in assessing civil liability, it
proceeds from the same beginning point as open-ended transferred intent,
felony-murder, and other outcome-based punishments. Someone must
(should) be held accountable for harms actually done, and it is just to visit
that accountability on the person who did the initial culpable act that
ultimately led to the harm. Leo Katz describes this position:
Murder, rape, and larceny have to be committed intentionally, or at
least knowingly. That's not required for crimes like manslaughter or
battery. Here it's enough that the defendant was reckless or negligent.
You may balk at this. The speeding driver who loses control of his
car and hits a pedestrian didn't have "harm on his mind," no more so,
it seems, than if he had done so in an unforeseen epileptic fit. He
probably deeply regrets what happened. Aren't we blaming him for
something that befell him rather than for something that he did? Not
really. Unlike the surprised epileptic, he knew of precautions he
could have taken to reduce the risk of an accident--driving more
slowly, taking a nearby highway. In a way, he did have "harm on his
mind," the harm of risk to others. That makes him blameworthy and
deserving of punishment. 255
Katz's example is useful as a way to think about how far Texas law
departs from the unremarkable notion that a criminally negligent, or
reckless, driver should be punished for injuring another.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679- 82 (1994) (explaining the "harm doctrine" is irrational in its
failure to punish those lucky persons who nevertheless are culpable).
254. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS 112- 13 (2d ed. 1999) (defendant must
take plaintiff "as is").
255. LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 191
(1987).
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Katz asks whether we are blaming the driver for "something that befell
him rather than for something that he did." 256 An element of luck is present
in this example, as it is in virtually every outcome connected with criminal
activity. It is unlucky that the thief is hungry, or that he lacks the moral
character or understanding of law that would restrain him, or that his
seemingly safe crime caused someone to be injured, or that the person
injured was harmed to a degree beyond reasonable expectation, or that the
thief was detected, or apprehended, or prosecuted, or convicted. Some of
this "bad luck" was the fault of the person/ 57 some was luck-of-the-draw.258
At what point, if any, should the thief-an unsympathetic figure-be
relieved of responsibility because of misfortune? Katz's illustration
implicitly suggests one answer: the driver should not be held accountable
for an "unforeseen epileptic fit." A speeding driver usually will be lucky,
and will not be caught or cause anyone any harm, if it were otherwise, there
probably would be far fewer speeders. If she is not lucky, however, and hits
a pedestrian, Katz is correct that she had "harm" on her mindculpability-in the form of risk-taking. If the driver is a known epileptic,
driving also involves conscious risk-taking, and justifies punishment for
any harm caused.
A driver who does not know she is epileptic, though, is not aware of
any risk posed by her driving, not because there is none, but because she
has no basis for knowing of it, and it is not foreseeable to her. Presumably,
that driver would not be held responsible for engaging in precisely the same
behavior as the known epileptic, and for causing exactly the same bad
result. So too, the thief or arsonist or batterer is justly held responsible, not
just for the harm intended, but also for the harm risked. That risk, however,
ordinarily justifies criminal responsibility only where it is "substantial," that
is, where it is sufficiently likely to produce harm that a person either is
actually aware of the risk, or should be. 259 Should the risk be unknown and
one that not even a reasonable person would anticipate, 260 as in the case of
256. !d.
257. A certain degree of"bad luck" in a person's situation or character simply is overlooked
by criminal law, although extreme examples, like insanity, are not. To a significant extent, fortuity
is pervasive. See Eric Lotke, Reflection and the Limits of Liability: Necessary Blindness in the
Legal System, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1425, 1446 (1993).
258. Good luck also impacts punishment, of course. When it does, similar concerns are raised
because the culpable person "catches a break" and escapes more severe punishment despite his
blameworthiness. See Kadish, supra note 253, at 679-82 ("harm doctrine" is irrational). But see
Loewy, supra note 2, at 283, 288-90 (use of harm to determine punishment is virtually universal).
259. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(c)-(d) (Vernon 2003); REAMEY, supra note 57, at 120
(comparing recklessness and criminal negligence).
260. Unawareness of substantial risk is criminal negligence only if the failure to perceive it
"constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §
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the undiagnosed epileptic, it seems unjust to punish the risk-taker for a
261
result that "befell him rather than .. . something that he did."
Distinguishing "personal-fault-plus bad luck" from "there-but-for-thegrace-of-God bad luck" is a useful way to begin to decide whether harmbased punishment is just. Viewing the examples of misfortune described in
this article through this simple lens reveals how likely it is that people in
Texas will be punished for their ill-fortune more than for their personal
fault.
Felony-murder, despite criticism of the doctrine, has been accepted
rather widely as a permissible way to further deter people from committing
felonies, especially dangerous ones. Because it includes the potential of
deterrence, and appears from the language of the Texas statute to be limited
to felonies done in a dangerous fashion, the rule lacks the sweep found in
some other harm-based enhanced punishments. Further, culpability is
required, at least for the underlying felony. 262
The very purpose of felony-murder, however, is to punish as murder a
death that was not the goal of the felon, and may not have been entirely
foreseeable. If foreseeability, as in Katz's example, separates culpable bad
luck from pure happenstance, felony-murder logically should be employed
only in those cases in which the felon commits "an act clearly dangerous to
human life." 263 Doing a clearly dangerous act is risky, and death may result.
The actor is blameworthy for this disregard of risk, and some punishment is
just, as it is for the speeding driver.
The existence of fault does not settle the question for Texas felonymurder law, however, either on its face or as it has been interpreted. First, it
is entirely possible, and in many cases must be, that the risk taken by the
felon during the commission of his crime was insufficiently substantial to
support a murder conviction. Risk-taking, except when it reaches the level
of reasonable certainty, 264 justifies no more than a manslaughter conviction,
and not murder. 265 Secondly, the "act clearly dangerous" requirement, as
noted earlier, has not always been applied with rigor. If it suffices for
felony-murder, in spite of the statutory language, that a person died because
of some not-very-dangerous act by the felon, the felon essentially is
punished for something "that befell him." If there is a difference in this case
6.03(d).
261. See KATZ, supra note 255, at 191.
262. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3).
263. Jd This "act clearly dangerous" language is the Texas formulation. Other states restrict
the reach of felony-murder in other ways.
264. When an outcome is known by the actor to be reasonably certain, he is said to have
acted "knowingly," which satisfies the culpability requirement for murder. See id §§ 6.03(b),
19.02(b)(l).
265. See id § 19.04(a).
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and that of the undiagnosed epileptic driver, it is only that the driver is more
"innocent" at the outset in the eyes of the law because she was not engaged
in a felony at the time. The debt owed society for committing a felony,
though, is paid by its own, separate punishment. Supplementing that
punishment by also punishing the actor for murder simply because the
actor's timing was bad, seems no more appropriate or proportionate than
charging the speeding driver with "speeding-murder" for a death occurring
in a traffic accident not caused by grossly excessive speed. The co-existing
misconduct just has nothing to do with the death.
The same problems attend use of a broader version of transferred
intent. Particularly if the Texas transferred intent statute 266 is read liberally
to allow relatively lower levels of culpability to suffice for offenses
typically requiring greater levels, application of transferred intent takes on
the feel of a lottery rather than punishment commensurate with the risk
actually taken. In some such cases, it ceases to deter at all, except in the
most general, indirect, and probably ineffective sense.
The more recent punishment enhancement provisions for evading
arrest and Texas's feticide statutes also lack any significant deterrence
effect, but they go even further than prior statutes in removing punishment
from the control of the actor. 267 In theory, if not in practice, the felonymurder statute promises the would-be felon that if she commits her crime
safely, there will be no murder charge for any death that coincides with the
felony. No similar limitation exists in either of the more recent punishmentenhancement laws.
A person evading arrest may flee as carefully as possible and, owing to
the bad luck, poor coordination, lack of skill, imprudence, or frail physical
condition of the pursuing officer, find himself convicted of a felony with a
mandatory prison sentence rather than a relatively minor misdemeanor. If
the thief is fortunate enough to be pursued by a store employee instead of a
peace officer, his evasion from apprehension is not punished at all,
regardless of what happens to the pursuer, and despite the fact that the store

See id. § 6.04(b).
Michael Moore addresses the importance of control in assessing punishment in this way:
It cannot matter to an offender's just deserts whether the wind, a bird, or a quantum
shift moved the bullet that an offender sent on its way, intending to kill another, for
these causal influences are wholly beyond the control of the offender. What he can
control is whether he intends to kill and whether he executes that intention in a
voluntary action of moving his finger on the trigger; all the rest is chance. The offender
deserves to be punished only for factors he can control, not for those chance events he
can't control.
Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
266.
267.

ISSUES 237, 239 (1994).
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employee or any other citizen has a legal right to arrest the offender. 268
Texas feticide is, if anything, even more random. Neither the actor nor
the mother need know of the pregnancy, or that the act would be likely to
cause the death of the fetus or embryo. Some "bad people" who injure or
kill a woman will be lucky and avoid homicide or assault punishment for
harming the fetus, either because none exists or because their conduct does
not produce the harm. Others will not be so lucky. Some "not-so-bad"
people will be unlucky and receive unexpected punishment because an act
that could not be expected to harm a healthy woman who is not pregnant
(and, in fact, did not harm her), might harm an embryo whose existence is
unknown. The unlucky of both sorts understandably will not comprehend
why even a very bad mother who intentionally kills her fetus is exempted
from punishment.
The use of "lotteries" such as these to determine punishment in Texas
produces seemingly unjust results because they are based on harm rather
than "just deserts." Larry Alexander questions the justification for harmbased punishment lotteries in this way:
The question I would raise is, assuming punishment lotteries are both
permissible and socially useful, why should we choose the causation
of harm- rather than, say, drawing a certain color Jot-as the event
that determines the lottery's outcome? Cause-in-fact is sometimes
difficult to prove, and proximate causation is a muddle. Why not just
run a real lottery and draw lots? What benefits do we obtain from the
harm lottery that justify its extra costs?
I cannot answer these questions. Perhaps a proponent of the
materiality of harm causation can. Until answers are forthcoming, the
use of harm causation as a form of punishment lottery has not been
justified, even if punishment lotteries themselves are justifiable. 269
Placing emphasis on culpability, rather than on harm, is a more
intuitively and rationally satisfying way to assess punishment because it is
less random and arbitrary, and more reflective of the individual fault of the
actor. 270 Some degree of "bad luck" may persist but be ignored even though
one is focused on moral fault, 271 but the worst of the bad luck outcomes can
be avoided.
268. See TEX. CODE CRJM . PROC. ANN. art. 18. 16 (Vernon 2005) (authorizing any citizen to
arrest without warrant a person who has committed a theft).
269. Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 28 ( 1994).
270. As Alexander observes, "The case for the centrality of the culpable act rests not on
concerns about luck, but on the nature of retributive desert." !d. at 30. Sanford Kadish seems to
agree that the reliance on luck is "not rationally supportable," although he addresses the harm
doctrine by considering whether punishment should be reduced, rather than increased, where harm
does not coincide with culpability. See Kadish, supra note 253, at 679- 82 .
271. See Lotke, supra note 257, at 1447 (Legal doctrines conceal a great deal of bad luck.).
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This tendency to punish bad people for what they cause, even if it is
the result of bad luck, may be unavoidable to some extent. It is, after all,
axiomatic that "hard cases make bad law."272 The instances in which Texas
courts and the Texas Legislature have departed from traditional reliance on
culpability to impose harm-based punishment, generally have involved
these "hard cases." They were not "hard" because the legal concepts were
complex, so much as they were "hard" because tragic harms often befell
innocent people. The natural inclination to attach blame-and retributionto those who contribute to tragic harm is exacerbated by their moral
failings, although those failings may not have caused the harm in any
foreseeable way, or contributed to it.
By exploiting the opportunities in pre-existing law, and creating new
opportunities to punish randomly the "bad people" who cause tragic harm,
Texas's courts and legislature risk undermining confidence in criminal
justice within the state. We may not identify or sympathize easily with all
of those whose actions produce such harm, but reliance on just deserts
rather than the pull of retribution will establish a moral authority in the
pronouncements of the legal institutions of Texas that cannot coexist in a
system in which criminal responsibility turns primarily, and sometimes
exclusively, on chance.

272. See J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, No. 02-0455, 2005 WL 1186334, at *4 (Tex. May
20, 2005) (Hecht, J., concurring) (not released for publication) (stating "hard cases make bad law"
is a "very venerable" principle); see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").

